Introduction
Canada used to matter a good deal more than it does now in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, at the creation of Israel, Supreme Court Justice Ivan Rand was the dominant member of UNSCOP, the United Nations Commission that recommended the partition of Palestine. At the United Nations, Lester Pearson was the key figure in passing the relevant resolution in the General Assembly.[1] But such is no longer the case. The contrast between Canada's current lack of diplomatic exertion in the Arab - Israeli conflict and its leadership in other areas, such as South Africa and Yugoslavia, is striking. And it is also true that Canada’s Western allies have not discouraged a more active Canadian role.[2] So what happened?
One explanation is that Canada cannot be everywhere. The flaw in that argument is that Canada participates in just about every peacekeeping mission. So why is it not active in other areas? Another explanation is that other conflicts that are more directly important to Canada. If that is the case, however, why did this not occur to Canadian foreign-policy makers after World War II, instead of later? A final explanation is that, as many observers have noted, “…a pro - Israel bias has diminished the effectiveness of Canada's policy in the Arab - Israeli conflict.” [3] As Kim Richard Nossal has pointed out, the position of Canada has always been that the people of the Middle East must come to terms with the existence of Israel. Another explanation, which this paper will argue, is that Canada has moved from pursuing a strategy to conducting strategic intervention, from trying to be one of the powers involved in trying to solve the conflict, it has come to focus on one particular aspect where it might have an influence. As we shall see, that aspect is the question of refugees. What the analysis concludes is that Canada would have an even greater impact if it focused its efforts about refugees, right now focused on women and children, to prevent radicalization of comparatively educated young men in the Gaza strip.
It is important from the start to set out some of the limits of this paper. First, it will look at the Arab-Israeli conflict, excluding such important issues as the Iraq war or the present situation in Afghanistan. Second, given the complications of the conflict, where every word can be value-laden and contested, I supplement my examination of Canadian policy made official by Foreign Affairs and International Trade as of October 2008 with neutral historical sources. Third and finally, I will examine the declaratory policy as well as initiatives for the years 2004 to 2008.
This paper is made up of four parts. The first looks for any strategy, first in Canada’s positions on various issues that make up the Arab-Israeli conflict, and then looks at the declaratory policy which is its expression. The second part looks for characteristics and mistakes typical of underdog strategy in this declaratory policy. The third part looks at the concrete initiatives, as opposed to only statements, and looks to see whether there is something more to add to the search for a Canadian strategy. It concludes by suggesting that the best next step to take is to refocus Canada’s concrete efforts to make it more strategic, more of a strategic intervention. Specifically, Canada’s programs for Palestinian refugees should also focus on deradicalization or the prevention of radicalization in the Gaza strip.
In order to follow the argument made here, it is necessary to define a few terms, which may not be familiar to readers. These terms are: strategy, tactics, underdog strategy, core idea, and strategic intervention. A strategy is an idea that orchestrates actions to reach a goal. Tactics are actions that make up strategy. Underdog strategy is a type of strategy: whereas strong-side strategy is concerned with reaching a goal, underdog strategy is a strategy that is an answer to the following questions: “What is the best thing you can do when you have no power and no money.” The characteristics of underdog strategy are capture by the core idea. For an underdog strategy, you need a metaphor, image or slogan that is intuitively clear to make all decisions in a complex or unpredictable or changing situation consistent: that is the core idea. Finally a strategic intervention is a particular type of tactic, one that answers the questions: “What is the best thing you can do, when you only have one chance?” in a crisis, or “How can I make a bad idea work?” outside a crisis situation.
We can now move to the first part of the argument, with a discussion of Canada’s declaratory policy.
Canada’s Declaratory Policy
Canada’s declarations on the Arab-Israeli conflict are made in a range of circumstances, such as reactions from Ottawa to particular events, or in speeches made at votes at the United Nations General Assembly. They are updated as events develop. With respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the statements focus on the following themes: support for Israel and its security, support for the Palestinians, support for a comprehensive peace settlement, statements on the status of Jerusalem, statements on settlements and the occupied territories, statements on Palestinian refugees, statements on terrorism, statements about UN resolutions, and statements about the barrier built between Israel and Gaza.[4]
Canada supports Israel's right to live in peace with its neighbors within secure boundaries and recognizes Israel's right to assure its own security. Canada recognizes that Israel has a right under international law to take the necessary measures, in accordance with human rights and international humanitarian law, to protect the security of its citizens from attacks by terrorist groups. Canada also recognizes the Palestinian right to self-determination and supports the creation of a sovereign, independent, viable, democratic and territorially contiguous Palestinian state, as part of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace settlement. Canada recognizes the Palestinian Authority (PA) as the governmental entity in the West Bank and Gaza, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the principal representative of the Palestinian people. Canada continues to support Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas. Canada considers that the 1993 Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Declaration of Principles continues to provide the basis for a comprehensive agreement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Canada also strongly supports the Quartet's Road Map, which sets out the obligations of both parties and steps for establishment of a Palestinian state, and the process launched by the Annapolis Conference. Canada also supports the Arab Peace Initiative as a potential basis for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement.
Canada considers the status of Jerusalem can be resolved only as part of a general settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. Canada does not recognize Israel's unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem. Canada believes that a just solution to the Palestinian refugee issue is central to a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that it must be negotiated among the parties concerned in the context of a final status peace agreement. Canada continues to focus international attention on improving the situation of the more than four million Palestinian refugees. Canada does not recognize permanent Israeli control over territories occupied in 1967 (the Golan Heights, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip). Canada considers that Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace. Canada recognizes Israel's right to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks, including through the restriction of access to its territory, and by building a barrier on its own territory for security purposes. Canada opposes expropriations and the demolition of houses and economic infrastructure carried out for this purpose. Canada condemns all acts of terrorism and terrorists should be brought to justice and prosecuted in accordance with international law. Canada has listed Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, and other groups as terrorist organizations. Canada supports UN resolutions that are consistent with Canadian policy on the Middle East are rooted in international law reflect current dynamics, contribute to the goal of a negotiated two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and address fairly and constructively the obligations and responsibilities of all parties to the conflict. Canada rejects one-sided resolutions and any politicization of the issues. Canada has long been concerned about the polemical and repetitive nature of many of the numerous UN resolutions.
Having considered the themes of Canada’s declaratory policy, we can now ask ourselves whether Canada has a strategy for the Arab-Israeli conflict. For Canada to have a strategy, it has to have a goal, a core idea and tactics. In this case, the tactics would be the various statements that Canada makes periodically. To do so, we can look at the various declarations arise from these policy positions. Tables 1 through 4 show the statements made by Canada and the events in the Arab-Israeli conflict for each of the yeas 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008.
Table 1: Declaratory Policy and Selected Contemporary Events, 2004
| September | |
| October: Minister Pettigrew renewed call to end violence in | |
| November: PM statement on death of Arafat; | |
| December Minister of Justice to visit the | |
Table 2: Declaratory Policy and Selected Contemporary Events, 2005
| January: PM statement on election of new Palestinian Authority President | election of new Palestinian Authority President; National Religious Party left the |
| February PM statement about end of Palestinian hostilities; Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke to the Israel-Canada Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Statement by Foreign Affairs Minister on the terrorist attack in Tel Aviv; Minister of Foreign Affairs to visit the Middle East; address by Minister of Foreign Affairs to London meeting | Abbas negotiated a truce agreement among Palestinians; Israeli and Palestinian leaders announced an end to the violence; Egypt and Jordan returned ambassadors to Israel; Intifada deemed over |
| March: Minister of Foreign Affairs urged | the London Conference organized financial support for the Palestinian government; Palestinian militant groups met in Cairo and agreed to a lull in the fighting; Hamas and Islamic Jihad groups rejoined the PLO; Israel withdrew from Jericho, and Tulqarm; Israel and Palestinian Authority continued to catch militants planning attacks or smuggling arms; Al-Aqsa brigades fired on Abbas' headquarters in Ramallah; Israeli government accepted report on 20 to 30 illegal West Bank outposts; Palestinians upset by the advancing Israeli security barrier |
| April | Sharon and Abbas visited the POTUS; Palestinian attacks on |
| May President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmud Abbas, visits Canada | |
| June | Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that the sides had agreed to destroy the houses of Gaza settlers after Israeli withdrawal; Sharon and Abbas met in a long-awaited summit; violence flared following the summit, Israel launching air attacks against rocket launchers in Gaza and resuming its policy of targeted killings of Islamic Jihad terrorists; in Palestine, demonstrations and even armed attacks continued against the leadership. |
| July | Abbas invited the Hamas and Islamic Jihad to join a unity government; Islamic Jihad from Tul Karm suicide-bombed Netanya; IDF reoccupied Tul Karm, arrested several Islamic Jihad members and killed a Palestinian policeman who opened fire on them; Hamas in Gaza shot rockets fire on Gaza settlements and Israeli towns; IDF launched rocket attacks in Gaza and a manhunt for Hamas military leaders in Hebron area; battle between Palestine National Authority forces trying to restore order and Hamas members in Gaza |
| August Statement by the Prime Minister on the | |
| September PM welcomed | last Israeli soldiers left |
| December | President Ahmadi-Nejad calls for |
Table 3: Declaratory Policy and Selected Contemporary Events, 2006
| January | Sharon ill, succeeded by Ehud Olmert; Hamas won 74 of the 133 seats in the Palestine Legislative Assembly, Fatah and PLO in opposition; EU and US leaders refused to deal with Hamas until it disarms and recognizes Israel |
| February statement on the situation in the Palestinian Authority | |
| March: | new Palestinian Cabinet sworn in;[6] severe financial crisis; Kadima gained 29 seats in Israeli elections |
| April statement by Foreign Affairs Minister on bombing in Tel Aviv | |
| June Statement by Minister Mackay on the Inclusion of Palestinian and Israeli National Societies into Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement; Minister Mackay Expresses Concern Over Situation in the Gaza Strip | fighting between Hamas and Fatah broke out, including killings and kidnappings of officials; almost 1000 Palestinian rockets hit |
| July | Hamas rockets were fired against |
| August | with cease-fire negotiations at an impasse, Israeli troops advanced 30 km inside |
| November: | IDF operations in Rafah uncovered extensive tunnels used for smuggling; negotiations for the return of Gilad Shalit stalled; Palestinians and Israelis announced a surprise truce; Syrian offer to negotiate peace "without conditions" rejected because of continuing Syrian support for terror groups |
| December | Olmert met with Abbas and announced release of frozen funds, removal of some checkpoints, weapons transfer for Fatah); renewed violence between Palestinian factions; |
Table 4: Declaratory Policy and Selected Contemporary Events, 2007
| January: Foreign Minister visit to the Middle East; demonstrated importance of relationships in the Middle East, commitment to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace | |
| May: Foreign Minister concerned by ongoing rocket attacks on | |
| June | serious fighting between Hamas and Fatah; Israeli newspapers flooded with |
| July Canada provided support to the new Palestinian government | |
| November: Canadian trade mission to the | Annapolis conference led to commitment by Abbas and PM Olmert to negotiate peace by end of 2008; low-level Syrian delegation concerned with Golan Heights had been placed on the agenda;[8] sharp decline in Hamas popularity |
| December Canada announced a commitment of $300 million over 5 years towards improving Palestinian security, governance and prosperity | |
Table 5: Declaratory Policy and Selected Contemporary Events, 2008
| January | Rocket attacks continued. |
| February | an Israeli missile strike killed 5 Hamas terrorists; Hamas launched 30 Iranian rockets; |
| April: Minister Bernier condemned attack on delegation visiting Sderot; expressed concern about death threats against Shirin Ebadi | |
| June Canada reaffirmed support for Palestinian reform | Hamas-Israel lull; |
In other words, events are greeted and welcomed and deplored… from Ottawa. As we can see, there is no explicit goal in these statements, nor is there an explicit core idea. So we can conclude there is no strategy for the period studied, as far as the declaratory policy is concerned. But are there any elements of an underdog’s strategic thinking? This is where the analysis gets interesting. Underdog strategic thinking has certain characteristics, and here we find some evidence that Canada’s declaratory policy possesses them. Table 6: Characteristics and Canadian Policy, provides a summary.
Table 6: Characteristics and Canadian Policy
| Underdogs are always thinking about what the strong are about to do. | Yes; Canada thinks about the US all the time in its foreign policy |
| The underdog is holistic. | Yes; in its foreign policy, Canada has put great emphasis on multilateral areas, to compensate for the heavy influence of the US i.e. paid up at the UN, participates in NATO |
| The underdog is always adapting. | No; Canada hasn’t changed in years in terms of its declaratory game. It makes declarations whether there is a crisis or not, viz. the current military operation in Gaza in Jan 2009, just ahead of the Obama inauguration and the Israeli election. |
| The underdog plays a waiting game. | No evidence either way |
| The underdog is creative. | No; there is not much originality or creativity, but there has been consistency; holier than thou, viz. |
| The underdog sees the big picture. | Yes; Canada can fairly been accused of Atlanticism i.e. thinking only of north America and western Europe for all these years. Viz. the literature which is extremely limited, not just re: middle east, but in general. |
| The underdog is constantly scanning his environment. | No; Not with the size of military we have. |
| The underdog specifically designs each action to suit his strategy. | No; The declaratory phase is without forethought, it would appear. |
| The underdog is constantly forecasting for all events. | No; That would be absent or else the participation of Canada would be different. |
| The underdog assumes s/he will lose any direct confrontation. | No, since there is NATO behind us. |
| The underdog will break even his/her own rules of behavior in order to achieve his goal. | No, |
| The underdog’s passions or passionate feelings are engaged. | No; Canada is not passionately committed to anything. On the contrary we are rather middle of the road. |
| Thinking like an underdog is not just when there is a problem. | No; Canada operates in an atmosphere of great prosperity and security. |
So there is evidence of four underdog characteristics in Canada’s more general foreign policy, although none that are specific to the policy in the Middle East.
Underdog strategic thinking can also be identified by its typical mistakes. Here again, as summarized in Table 7, Typical Mistakes and Canadian Policy, we find partial evidence.
Table 7: Typical Mistakes and Canadian Policy
| Not keeping things simple and honest. | No: The refugee program could hardly be simpler. |
| Going against, instead of with, the flow of events. | No. Canada is not doing enough to be going against the grain or ruffling any feathers. |
| Ignoring the need to wait, rushing headlong into action. | No, I believe Canada is thoughtful, although the jury is out about Afghanistan |
| Ignoring the unintended consequences of your actions. | No evidence either way |
| Working on the wrong problem. | Yes. Canada has not correctly identified the causes of the conflict, and therefore is ineffective |
| Not specifying their objectives enough | yes |
| Not developing enough alternatives. | Don’t know; hard to say what is in policy-makers minds |
| Giving inadequate thought to tradeoffs. | No; inadequate thought to what could be gained, or a contribution worthy of being made |
| Disregarding uncertainty. | No; disregards that doing nothing is also a decision |
| Failing to account for your risk tolerance. | No; risk tolerance is very low, probably a major factor in decision-making. |
| Failing to plan ahead when decisions are linked over time | No |
| Not trusting your intuition. | No |
So we have evidence that there is some underdog strategic thinking in Canadian foreign policy in general, but no evidence that there is a strategy in the declaratory policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. So what is Canada doing?
The reader will recall the definition of strategic intervention given in the introduction to this paper. We can investigate whether Canada is using a strategic intervention, i.e. a tactic well-crafted from the standpoint of the big picture in a highly complex situation. We can investigate whether there is a strategic intervention by reviewing the initiatives, as opposed to the declarations, taken by Canada in the Arab-Israeli conflict for the same period. These are almost all in the area of refugees. In this area, Canada has been quite active. It participated in international refugee-related working groups. It relocated Palestinian refugees from a camp in the Sinai back to Gaza. It provided Palestinian women in Lebanon with scholarships. It funded innovation in small non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) in the area. And it stated that any lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East must include a solution for refugees. Canada supports research and activities that aim to improve understanding of the core refugee issues.
These initiatives were preceded by active engagement on Canada’s part. Before 2000, Canada held the chairmanship of the Refugee Working Group in 1992, and participated in it until its suspension in 1996. This working group organized four formal missions to refugee camps between 1994 and 1999. It also participated in similar missions to refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria. The goal here was to highlight the complexity of the problems and their urgency. It recently renewed an international dialogue on the issue through the Refugee Coordination Forum. Canada also funded a program to relocate Palestinian refugees from Canada Camp in the Sinai to Gaza between 1994 and 2000. All Palestinians in Canada Camp are now back in the
More than 200 women from Palestinian refugee communities in Lebanon have received scholarships from this fund to pursue local undergraduate university degrees and develop professional and management skills in such sectors as business, engineering, biology and science. The fund is managed by the International Development and Research Centre on behalf of the Canadian International Development Agency. The Canada Fund is a development program administered by Canadian missions in the region which aims to assist non-governmental organizations to carry out small innovative development projects.
So compared to the declaratory policy, these contributions have been of more practical significance. While there are many themes in declaratory policy, there is only one area where there is activity, that of the refugees, an area where Canada has considerable expertise, and has acted with distinction. And it meets the requirements of a strategic intervention. To design a strategic intervention instead of a strategy, it is necessary to look at the other parties’ actions and instead of creating a strategy, to reverse engineer the best tactics that can be designed. This can be done by identifying the do-or-die moments, by determining who are the significant political actors in the country, individuals or groups, by distinguishing between significant and insignificant actors, by examining what influence various actors have on a particular action, by determining which resources support the political system, which are scarce, and which are essential, by looking at how political actors manage them, what factors favor which political actors. The latter questions are also asked of tactics, actors, resources, rules. Only then can a response be designed, a response much more likely to have an impact.
That analysis reveals that in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the key to the rest of the peace negotiations really are the refugees. I.e. the Palestinians who became concentrated in Gaza and the West Bank. Since the Palestinian populations migrated in the course of several conflicts, their status and condition has been the primary source of international concern and attention paid by the international community. And Canada was building on one of its strengths. It is also suited to the moderate type and amount of resources Canada has been willing to commit. So Canada got the right answer, and took the right course of action. Instead of a larger-scale commitment such as was more probable after World War II, we see here a smaller scale commitment, but one which focuses on a key issue. If we are to continue with this effort, however, we need to focus even more. But if Canada’s actions are both effective and wise so far, does the foregoing analysis propose any further way to improve? Certainly, if Canada does not want to become a major player and implement a strategy in the Middle East, and there are no signs that it does, then it should at least conduct a strategic intervention.
Conclusion
If Canada wants to go one step further and maximize the impact of its initiatives, then I propose that it should focus on preventing radicalization of the Palestinian population. This is happening primarily in Gaza, and primarily to young men of comparative education. The next focus should be meaningful occupation, i.e. employment for these young men, who may have already have contacts with radical elements.
This paper began with an examination of Canada’s position on various issues that make up the Arab-Israeli conflict, as discovered through its declaratory policy. The evidence regarding strategy was contradictory, with no evidence of a core idea but some evidence of underdog strategic thinking. An analysis of Canadian initiatives revealed evidence that there was a strategic intervention occurring, specifically with regard to the refugees in the area. Having moved from pursuing a strategy to conducting strategic intervention, from trying to be one of the powers involved in trying to solve the conflict, Canada has come to focus on one particular aspect where it might have an influence, on the question of refugees. Canada would have an even greater impact if it focused its efforts about refugees, right now focused on women and children, to prevent radicalization of comparatively educated young men in the Gaza strip. Strategic intervention provides the tools necessary to design such programs to maximum inventiveness.
[1] Ann Hillmer, "'Here I am in the Middle,' Lester Pearson and the Origins of Canada's Involvement in the Middle East," in David Taras and David Goldberg, The Domestic Battleground: Canada and the Arab - Israeli Conflict (Kingston: McGill - Queen's University Press, 1989).
[2] Peyton Lyon. “The Canada Israel Committee and Canada's Middle East policy,” Journal of Canadian Studies 27:4 (Winter 1992), 5ss.
[3] Peyton Lyon. “The Canada Israel Committee and Canada's Middle East policy,” Journal of Canadian Studies 27:4 (Winter 1992), 5ss.
[5]Keesing's Record of World Events 51 (December 2005), 46906.
[6] Keesing’s Record of World Events, 52 (February 2006), 47175-76.
[7] Keesing's Record of World Events 52 (July 2006), 47392-3 and 47342-43.
[8] Keesing's Record of World Events, 53 (November 2007), 48277.
Revitalizing Strategy Thinking
The Uses of Underdog Strategy in International Security
Laure Paquette, Ph.D.
Associate Fellow
Université Laval
8-10 May 2009
Centuries ago, Aristotle explicitly excluded from philosophical discourse mètis, the way of thinking of women and the vanquished.[1] Various Aristotelian revivals have encouraged that exclusion since, including that of the Renaissance.[2] It has had many consequences, but for the study of strategy, it has meant that its theory and practice quickly became restricted first to the study of victors. However, the practice of mètis, the strategy of the weak and powerless, did not disappear. This paper argues in favour of returning it to scholarly discourse in International Security by providing several different applications in the field. The present significance of reintroducing the mètis are obvious, both the fight against terrorism, and for the challenges posed by counter-insurgency in both
In order to follow the argument made here, it is necessary to define a few terms, which may not be familiar even to scholars of international security. These terms are: strategy, tactics, underdog strategy, core idea, and strategic intervention. A strategy is an idea that orchestrates actions to reach a goal. Tactics are actions that make up strategy. Where strong-side strategy is concerned with reaching a goal, underdog strategy tries to answer this question: “What is the best thing you can do when you have no power and no money?” The characteristics of underdog strategy are captured by the core idea. For an underdog strategy, you need a metaphor, image or slogan that is intuitively clear to make all decisions in a complex or unpredictable or changing situation consistent. That is the core idea. The three main characteristics of underdog strategy, captured by the core idea, are: they are more holistic, they change their scope much more easily, and they use a greater range of tactics much more easily. Finally a strategic intervention is a particular type of tactic, one that answers the questions: “What is the best thing you can do, when you only have one chance?” in a crisis, or “How can I make a bad idea work?” outside a crisis situation.
The core idea of a strategy promotes the use of analogical thinking. Analogical thinking is one of those cognitive devices that are mental short-cut for making decisions, large and small, and we all use them in every day life. Using analogies for decision making or problem solving simply means this: we ask ourselves if we have ever encountered this situation before, and try the solution that worked before. Analogical thinking is recommended for emergency responders, among others, in highly complex, uncertain situations.[3] But it has spread beyond that sphere. “In one of the more unlikely collaborations of modern medicine,
This paper will explore several applications of underdog strategy in international security. First, there are two applications to show the analytical potential for what were problems with new urgency: identifying characteristics of underdog strategy in an insurgency, and identifying common mistakes of underdog strategy made by terrorists. Then I turn to government responses: the proposal for a strategic intervention, and how a government might deal with an insurgency. Finally, there is an application to military training, identifying the strategic corporal.
There are several other applications which are not covered by this paper, but which are mentioned in the conclusion.
Underdog Characteristics and Military Operations: US Defeat the Taliban, 2001
For the most part, governments, groups, and individuals using underdog strategy share many of the same characteristics. These characteristics are meant to be relative: all countries, for example, can expect to be aware of what greater powers around them are doing, but underdogs devote more energy and time to such a consideration. The identification of the characteristics was made through direct observation of individuals and groups. (The analytical framework, on the other hand, was primarily developed for and applied to states and governments.) The characteristics are:
1. Underdog strategists are more aware of what the stronger groups or governments may do.
2. Underdog strategists are always adapting.
3. Underdog strategists are much more likely to play a waiting game.
4. Underdogs are more creative, because their means are so limited.
5. Underdog strategists are more holistic.
6. Underdog strategists spend more time scanning the environment for possible threats and opportunities.
Table 1: Evidence of Characteristics of Weak-Side Strategy
| Characteristic | Taliban insurgents |
| They are always thinking about what the strong are about to do | Opium traders moved to Nimroz from |
| They are always adapting. | Changed from regular warfare to assassinations and kidnappings, insurgency, suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices, financing by opium trade. |
| They play a waiting game. | Took time to regroup after losing control of country |
| They are creative. | Adopting the method of roadside bombs, imported from the |
| They are holistic. | Abandoned goal of military victory over ISAF; now targeting unwillingness of domestic NATO populations, using unanswerable methods |
| They are always scanning their environment. | Quickly identified the poverty of farmers as a possibly way to exert power over them |
| They specifically design each action to suit their strategy. | -- |
| They are always forecasting for all events. | -- |
| They are convinced they will lose a direct confrontation. | Gave up regular warfare; did not compete in elections |
| They will break their own rules. | Banned opium when in power, relied on opium trade as insurgents |
| Their commitment is complete. | willing to fight on despite facing a much more powerful enemy |
7. Underdogs are more likely to design each action specifically to suit their strategy.
8. Underdogs are much more likely forecast for even the unlikeliest tactic and scenario.
9. Underdog strategists usually assume they will lose any direct confrontation.
10. If the situation gets bad enough, underdog strategists are much more likely to break their own rules of behavior.
11. Underdog strategists are usually much more (even passionately) committed.
In the case of the Taliban defeat at the hands of the
Common Underdog Mistakes: Terrorism 1986-2002
Mistakes terrorists make are in their reasoning and/or planning, which is difficult to document when they are successful, and difficult to document after their failure, since that usually means death or capture. Moreover, what can be discovered after their defeat, the information is not always completely available in a timely way in open sources. It is therefore no surprise that some mistakes cannot be illustrated.
The mistakes are:
1. Working on the wrong problem.
2. Not specifying their objectives enough.
3. Not developing enough alternatives.
4. Giving inadequate thought to tradeoffs.
5. Disregarding uncertainty.
6. Failing to account for your risk tolerance.
7. Failing to plan ahead when decisions are linked over time.
8. Not trusting your intuition.
9. Not keeping things simple and discreet.
10. Going against the flow of events.
11. Ignoring the need to wait, rushing headlong into action.
12. Ignoring the unintended consequences of your actions.
Table 2: Evidence of Strategic Mistakes by Terrorists
| Type of Mistake | Terrorist Group and Action |
| Not Keeping Things Simple, Honest, Moderately Discreet | JEM collected funds through donation requests in magazines and pamphlets (assets seized by Pakistani government); Kahane Chai declared terror organization by Israel after it supported a Feb. 1994 attack on the al Ibrahimi Mosque; FARC’s internal politics, statutes defining the structure (squad, guerrilla, company, column, fronts, block of fronts, central high command); Tamil Tigers’ newspapers, press and propaganda section, political wing, research and development wing, and intelligence wing. |
| Ignoring The Need To Wait, Rushing Headlong Into Action. | Al Qaeda, Khalid Shaikh Mohommad had to introduce “losing and learning” doctrine, i.e. only a defeat if nothing is learned and mistakes repeated |
| Working on the Wrong Problem. | MEK expelled from |
| Failing to Plan Ahead When Decisions Are Linked Over Time. | Hizbollah repeatedly kidnapped Israeli soldiers or civilians; In 2006, kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers brought Israeli armed response |
| Not Specifying Their Objectives Enough. | Islamic Group of Egypt split into a faction supporting a ceasefire and a faction wanting to carry out attacks on US and Israeli interests; General Command of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine split from the rest of the Popular Front in 1968, wanting to fight more and politick less; Al Qaeda’s Kalid Shaikh Mohommad has to move from government, hard targets in Southeast Asia for soft targets like the Bali nightclub on October 12, 2002; FARC actual aims versus official, ideological struggle |
| Not Developing Enough Alternatives | Cease-fires used as stalling tactics by Hizbollah, IRA |
| Giving Inadequate Thought To Tradeoffs | Move from Marxism to nationalism to Islamism of PKK; move to enlarged campaign of violence in 1993; Sudanese walk-in from Al Qaeda over embezzlement, low pay; use of kidnapping, robbery and extortion by |
| Disregarding Uncertainty | Discomfiture of Shining Path, JVP, Aum Shimkyo, and PKK after capture of leaders |
| Failing To Account For Your Risk Tolerance. | Kalid Shaikh Mohommad, third in command of Al Qaeda, used layers of operatives between himself and organizers to protect himself; Leader of the LTTE murdered several of his own commanders for suspected treason, wore a cyanide capsule around his neck in case of capture; captured leaders of PKK and JVP begged not to be tortured |
Proposal for Strategic Intervention: Canadian Policy in the Middle East, 2000-2008
This application argues that the best next step to take is to refocus
The first step is to answer the question: are there any of the characteristics or typical mistakes by which one recognizes the underdog in
There are only four characteristics to which
We can now turn now to the question of strategic intervention: I begin by reviewing the initiatives by
Table 3: Characteristics and Canadian Policy
| Underdogs are always thinking about what the strong are about to do. | Yes; |
| The underdog is holistic. | Yes; in its foreign policy, |
| The underdog is always adapting. | No; |
| The underdog plays a waiting game. | No evidence either way |
| The underdog is creative. | No; there is not much originality or creativity, but there has been consistency; holier than thou, viz. |
| The underdog sees the big picture. | Yes; |
| The underdog is constantly scanning his environment. | No; Not with the size of military we have. |
| The underdog specifically designs each action to suit his strategy. | No; The declaratory phase is without forethought, it would appear. |
| The underdog is constantly forecasting for all events. | No; That would be absent or else the participation of |
| The underdog assumes s/he will lose any direct confrontation. | No, since there is NATO behind us. |
| The underdog will break even his/her own rules of behavior in order to achieve his goal. | No, |
| The underdog’s passions or passionate feelings are engaged. | No; |
| Thinking like an underdog is not just when there is a problem. | No; |
Table 4: Typical Mistakes and Canadian Policy
| Not keeping things simple and honest. | No: The refugee program could hardly be simpler. |
| Going against, instead of with, the flow of events. | No. |
| Ignoring the need to wait, rushing headlong into action. | No, I believe |
| Ignoring the unintended consequences of your actions. | No evidence either way |
| Working on the wrong problem. | Yes. |
| Not specifying their objectives enough | Yes |
| Not developing enough alternatives. | Don’t know; hard to say what is in policy-makers minds |
| Giving inadequate thought to tradeoffs. | No; inadequate thought to what could be gained, or a contribution worthy of being made |
| Disregarding uncertainty. | No; disregards that doing nothing is also a decision |
| Failing to account for your risk tolerance. | No; risk tolerance is very low, probably a major factor in decision-making. |
| Failing to plan ahead when decisions are linked over time | No |
| Not trusting your intuition. | No |
Before 2000,
More than 200 women from Palestinian refugee communities in
Compared to the declaratory policy, this certainly represents more activity and more practically meaningful contributions. What is interesting from an analytical standpoint is that while there are many themes in declaratory policy, there is only one area where there is activity, that of the refugees. It also happens to be an area where
My argument here is that, if
A Government Dealing With an Insurgency: Afghanistan 2001-2006
I begin by considering prima facie evidence regarding a government or group being in a disadvantaged or underdog situation, and whether this amounts to enough to justify assigning them underdog status. I then examine the characteristics and mistakes typical of underdogs.
Prima Facie Evidence of Underdog Status
The case that
Afghanistan state institutions have been weak for decades, giving rise to instability and unsuccessful attempts to modernize the society. These efforts go back to 1926 and the defeat of King Amanullah’s social reforms by conservative forces. In 1953, Prime Minister (and General) Mohammed Daud introduced social reforms again, including the abolition of the seclusion of women. After he left power, the introduction of a constitutional monarchy led to political polarization and power struggles. But in 1973, Daud seized power again. In playing the
There matters rested until terrorists attacked the
Given this history, then, it is no wonder the UN Security Council found
If the government of Afghanistan can be considered an underdog because of politics, the Taliban after 2001 can be considered underdogs for military ones. The case here rests on the military defeat of the Taliban government by the
Table 5: Evidence of Characteristics of Underdog Strategy
| Characteristic | Karzai government |
| They are always thinking about what the strong are about to do | Smaller political parties watched Hamid Karzai’s party to take advantage of any misstep. |
| They play a waiting game. | Slow, gradual development of legal system, modest Afghanistan Compact benchmarks on development |
| They are holistic. | Willingness to work with governments of other countries over development and reconstruction |
| They are always scanning their environment. | Starvation, refugee problems failed to materialize |
| They specifically design each action to suit their strategy. | Clearly conscious of the necessity for development and economic progress to support their efforts at democracy |
| They are always forecasting for all events. | Decision-making processes slow and ineffectual |
| They are convinced they will lose a direct confrontation. | Accepts both foreign troops, even when unpopular |
| They will break their own rules. | Bargains with warlords who operate outside the law, maintaining private armies and jails and threatening people who speak out against them in the Loya Jirga |
| Their commitment is complete. | ministers continuing to hold office despite the dangers of assassination |
Table 6: Evidence of Strategic Mistakes
| Type of Mistake | Karzai Government |
| Working on the Wrong Problem. | Foreign forces conquer the country, but not well suited to counter-insurgency |
| Not Specifying Their Objectives Enough. | Unclear terms of reference, procedures for: ministries, provincial offices, liaison between legislative and executive; too little accountability to prevent patronage, misuse of public funds, abuse of public land management, and corruption in the privatization of state-owned enterprises; policies sidelined increasing popular dissatisfaction, and favored marginalization and intolerance of political opposition |
| Giving Inadequate Thought To Tradeoffs | Inadequate vetting of army/police candidates led to harassment and threats to ppolitical organizers and journalists |
| Disregarding Uncertainty | Corruption of government officials |
| Failing To Account For Your Risk Tolerance. | History of ethnic and tribal lack of unity; domination of one ethnic group to the exclusion of others |
| Failing to Plan Ahead When Decisions Are Linked Over Time. | Allowing the opium trade to develop to the point of being a parallel power structure |
Identifying the Strategic Corporal in a Crowd
With a single half day’s worth of training, it is possible for armed forces to identify those who are already thinking in the same terms as the insurgents, the so-called strategic corporals, and to introduce the others to the basics of that way of thinking.[10] The main obstacle to the proposed training is habitus, their usual ways of thinking, which tends to become more rigid over time.[11]
Habitus is the system of durable, transferable dispositions produced by the conditioning associated with a particular class of conditions of existence. The conditions of existence produce generating, organizing principles of practice and of mental representation of situations, which can be objectively adapted in their aim, but without the awareness of those aims and the mastery explicit of the operations necessary to attain them. The more specialized the training, the more affluent and/or successful the people, the more resistance there can be to learning, the more rigid the way of thinking. However, the habitus usually will become less rigid in times of crisis: the more severe the crisis, the more open people will become, and while it may be too late to help solve the crisis at hand, it is possible to introduce training at that time.
In a range of people trained so far, there have always been a proportion of individuals who used strategy including mètis. There is no reason to think that NATO personnel would be an exception, although the proportion of those natural strategists is unknown. Moreover, the proportion of natural strategists among visible minorities, women, the disabled, and others with some sort of permanent disadvantage is much greater. If this also holds true for armed forces, then those who have made efforts at diversity may be receiving an unexpected dividend.
The proposed training proposed below takes about two hours. The two exercises are: discovery and diagnosis, and development of the core idea.
Exercise 1: Discovery and Diagnosis
This exercise takes one to one and a half hours. Its objective is to introduce the participants to the basics of strategy including mètis. The trainer asks participants to play a simple board game, such as checkers or chess. The materials required are simple: board games for every two or four participants, since the exercise works for people working in teams of two in playing the board game; pads of paper and pens; and either a chalkboard, a flipchart, an overhead projector or a document camera. The board game should be culturally appropriate and its rules common knowledge. The exercise allows for the use of translators if necessary. Once the matches are under way, gives participants a structured set of tasks of increasing complexity to force the failure of rational thought alone. The trainer then asks participants to come up with a core idea, and use it. The trainer observes participants and coaches them as necessary. What the trainer is looking for is the ability to predict outcomes in increasing numbers of scenarios, and the ability to think ahead to a much greater extent. People who can do this are likely to be natural strategists, and are much more likely to be practicing the strategy of the weak. The trainer confirms with participants when they are using mètis. At the close of this exercise, the trainer facilitates a discussion about the effectiveness of the first experience with a core idea. In the alternative, the trainer can assign the worksheet shown below, an integration learning tool commonly used in management or business
Exercise 2: The Core Idea
Because coming up with a core idea is often the most difficult part of thinking like an underdog, this exercise can be completed quickly that will stimulate the thinking of the participants.
Here, the participant must start thinking in metaphorical terms about the tasks at hand. This worksheet is deliberately simple, to facilitate the focus needed for mètis. In completing this worksheet, the participant will see that not all metaphors are equally practical or helpful -- it is therefore useful to develop a number of them so that the participant can choose the best one. The present worksheet should be completed for the same sample task described above.
There are a number of caveats to the training proposed above. First, the workshop and training are, at the time of this writing, untried and untested in this proposed application. Second, the proportions of types of practitioners of underdog strategists in the military is not known and the first type of learner may be found in much lower proportions than in other walks of life. Third, the training of troops proposed can be ordered, but the learning cannot. They may participate in the workshop while resisting the learning. Fourth, the people being trained are going to be primarily young men not given to introspection, to say nothing of abstract thought, and the habitus may proved an even greater obstacle than foreseen here. Fifth, the optimum effectiveness for this training is no doubt to have it integrated into the regular training, about which the author needs to know more.
| Sample Worksheet: Core Idea | |||
| Category | Suggested Metaphors, Images, Analogies, Role Models | Your Metaphors, Images, Role Models, Analogies | Core Idea |
| Military | Machine gun, rifle, tank | Battalion, submarine, armored personnel carrier | Work together like a c-3 gun and a shell |
| Geographical | River, waterfall, creek | Mountain, plateau, desert | A 24-hour oasis |
| Plant | Tree, fern, Venus flytrap | Flower, tomato, potato | Let’s close up camp like one of those evening prayer plants |
| Transportation | Bus, golf cart, car | Truck, walking, running, bicycle | Let’s make our break like a cruise ship for the night |
| Sports | Caddy, gymnastics, football | Soccer, tennis, ping pong | |
| Mechanical | Wrench, Allen key, ratchet | Silicone gun, screwdriver | |
| Insects | Mosquito, ant, butterfly | Bee, wasp, slug | Let’s circle around the queen bee |
| Animals | Cougar, puma rhinoceros | Tiger, lion, gazelle, turtle | |
| Role models | Princess Diana, Donald Trump, Gandhi | Mother Theresa, Montgomery of Alamein | |
| Your own Category: | Your own metaphors: | | |
Conclusion
There are three benefits to this approach.
(1) Unit of analysis
The analyst can forecast developments and actions much more accurately by using action as the unit of analysis rather than the actor. If the analyst uses patterns of actions, like strategy, it is even better. It is a little like playing chess. A player begins by observing the opponent’s moves. If these seem to be uncoordinated or going in a variety of different directions‚ so much the better. It means that the opponent is not thinking strategically‚ and will be that much easier to defeat. On the other hand‚ it may not be in the player’s best interest to make assumptions about an opponent’s confused state of mind or ineffective planning. Instead, the player has information about that opponent and can use it to predict the kind of strategy the opponent is most likely to use, based on that information. At that point‚ it is much easier to determine which strategy the opponent is actually using. Once the strategy is known‚ then the rate of success in predicting the tactical decisions will increase exponentially‚ whatever the circumstances. The main drawback is that strategic analysis based on the new definition of strategy provides insight only into the specific scope or level of the analysis, neither above nor below it. It means, in practical terms, that the analysis of national health policy will not provide guidance in the reform of radiology services in a hospital or private clinic, for example. It also means that the analysis will provide probabilities rather than certainties in its predictions.
(2) Mid-Level Theory
When David Easton outlined the three major levels of theory in political science, he discussed grand theory and low-level theory in the most detail.[12] Most difficult of all to grasp and to discuss was mid-level theory. Theories in International Relations or in public administration, for example, oscillated between grand and low-level theory. The potential contribution of a general theory of strategy and mètis, built around an old concept broadened out to apply to more than business or war is significant. At that time, strategy, to the extent it was studied at all, was considered to be within strategic studies, which was within international relations, which was within political science. If studied theoretically, then it had the potential to change the context easily – but there were few general theories of strategy at the mid-level, as
Strategy presents two advantages as the starting point for mid-level theory. First, it is integrative: it takes as its units of analysis action or patterns of action, rather than actors as does most other theory of political science. Second, it generates both high theory and practical applications, because strategy as a concept lies as the meeting place between thought and action. Students of strategy can therefore easily more towards the more abstract or the more practical, depending on his/her goals in research. This is what the theory and method has allowed.
(3) Polyvalence
As a phenomenon, strategy presents considerable theoretical and practical interest. From a theoretical standpoint, it presents the advantage of being applicable to a wide range of situations. Because it analyses action rather than the actor, it can be applied to any actor. Developing a general theory for strategy also frees its validity from any regional or thematic context. Strategy can therefore be applied to any context. From a practical standpoint, a strategy generates a number of polyvalent tools and training programs, intelligible to the strategist, but more importantly to the non-strategist lay person as well. These methodologies present the advantage of allowing learning from a book and a set of theoretical exercises, or by experiential pedagogy. They can be broken down into components requiring as little as one hour’s training for proficiency, as experience shows. These methodologies have been proposed as valid irrespective of the goals, aspirations, values, socio-economic circumstances, or worldviews of the individuals, groups, or institutions involved.
The polyvalence should be assed on the basis of three strands of research. The first strand focuses on methodological and theoretical development of this new theory of strategy. The second strand presents several structured sets of case studies focusing on the various types of actors in political science, broadly defined. The third strand presents a series of exercises and worksheets which pertain either to particular applications of strategy or which spans the intellectual development of a good strategist. There are several studies needed, summarized in Table 7. The studies already completed can be found in Table 8, Summary of Completed Studies, by Unit of Analysis.
Table 7: Summary of Necessary Research, by Unit of Analysis
| Level | Theory | Cases | Applications |
| Phenomenon | Strategic Research | Strategic Research | Strategic Research |
| Supranational group | Strategy and the Catholic Church | Strategy and the Catholic church | Strategy and Counterinsurgency |
| Systems | | Strategy and health cases | Strategy and health |
Table 7: Completed Studies, By Unit of Analysis
| Level | Theory | Cases | Applications |
| Phenomenon | Bioterrorism and Medical and Health Services Administration | Bioterrorism and Medical and Health Services Administration | Bioterrorism and Medical and Health Services Administration |
| Individual | Strategy for individuals | Strategy for individuals | Strategic activism, More Strategic Activism |
| Infranational group | Campaign Strategy | Campaign Strategy | Political strategy and politics |
| Supranational group | | | |
| Systems | Prescription for Change | | |
| States | Strategy and Ethnic Conflict | Various articles | Analyzing National and International Policy |
| Group of states | Strategy for the Pacific Century | NATO and | Path to peace |
My own desire is to have strategy used to improve the common good. Nonetheless, I cannot help but acknowledge, however, that strategy is an ethically neutral concept. Its application and results depend entirely on the user.
[1] Marcel Detienne et Jean-Pierre Venant, Les ruses de l’intelligence (Paris: Flammarion, 1972).
[2] Although daring, attempting such a correction is not without recent precedent.Philippe Nemo, What Is the West? (
[3] Gary Klein, Sources of Power (Boston: MIT Press, 1998), 213ss.
[4] Gautam Naik “Hospital Races to Learn Lessons of Ferrari Pit Stop,” Wall Street Journal
[5] Kate Murphy, “What Pilots Can Teach Hospitals About Patient Safety,” New York Times,
[6] “The Waggle Dance” New Scientist,
[7] John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Viking, 1987).
[8] Gary Klein, Sources of Power (Boston: MIT Press 1998).
[9] John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Viking, 1987).
[10] Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines Magazine (January 1999).
[11] Pierre Bourdieu, Le sens pratique (Paris : Minuit, 1980), p. 88.
[12] David Easton, Analysis of Political Structure (New York: Routledge, 1990).
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