Finding the Strategic Corporal in a Crowd

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Finding the Strategic Corporal in A Crowd

Laure Paquette, Lakehead University

The military personnel of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries are for the most part members of traditionally based armed forces. For traditionally based armed forces, counterinsurgency is a problem, even given the capabilities of special forces. At the time of this writing, the International Security Assistance Force operations of NATO in southern and western Afghanistan pose this particular problem directly and immediately. There are extensive counterinsurgency operations and Afghanistan is, in terms of terrain, geography, ethnic composition, economy and society almost a perfect breeding ground for insurgency.

The goal of this paper is to propose the addition of half a day’s worth of training to what the ISAF forces already get, before or during their time in Afghanistan to make them more effective in combating insurgents. The goal of this proposed training is to identify those who are already thinking in the same terms as the insurgents, the so-called strategic corporals, and to help those who are not yet, to do so.[1] I will therefore discuss the problem that soldiers face, propose a general solution to that problem, and then explain the development and actual components of the training that will apply that solution. I will close with a discussion about the possible problems in implementing the training. Although this training may be appropriate for all officers and senior non-commissioned officers, it is primarily aimed at the land element.

I. The Problems That Soldiers Face

Whatever we may think the problems are in fighting counterinsurgency, there is certainly no shortage of advice for the soldiers. The great classics like Mao, Giap or Gallula, the more recent takes on insurgency, often borne out of bitter experience, like Nagl and Kalev Sepp, even the idea of the three-block war adopted by the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff General Hillier all provide lists of dos and don’ts.[2] Among the do’s are: place the emphasis on intelligence, focus on the population and its needs, and establish then expand secure areas. Among the don’ts are: place the priority on killing or capture or kill the enemy rather than engage the population, use battalion-sized operations, and concentrate military units on large bases for protection. What all of this advice boils down to is that the soldier in counterinsurgency must now be diplomat, aid worker and killer on demand.

Such a shift requires some very important skills be taught and some important characteristics be developed. Their current training does provide the chance to develop self discipline and the ability to do their job under extreme stress. Two other capacities are also required: the ability to change gears quickly, and what I call the ability to telescope: the ability to act within a certain scope and forecast the consequences on a broader scale, or to act on a broader scale and be able to forecast the consequences on a smaller scale.

II. Obstacles to Telescoping

In acquiring, developing and actually using the capacity to telescope, soldiers face two obstacles. One they share with the population in general: the weak think differently from the strong. The second applies specifically to soldiers: their usual ways of thinking, or habitus, tend to become more rigid over time.[3]

The weak think differently from the strong, and it is hard for all members of society to start including those differences, for the following reason. At the time of Aristotle, the great philosopher deliberately excluded from future political discourse the mètis, the way of thinking of “women and the vanquished”. [4] Although this way of thinking did not disappear, discussions of it did, and we find ourselves by and large without the conceptual framework to incorporate it easily. This is especially true since the Aristotlelian revival after the Renaissance.[5] It would be surprising, to say the least, if NATO forces were the exceptions to this rule. However, research into the concept of strategy has already allowed for the incorporation of characteristics of this mètis, and the training below provides a simple heuristic device, the core idea, to help soldiers incorporate it into their own thinking. The core idea forces the use of more than the rational powers characteristic of Aristotlelian thought dominant, as we have seen, in most western cultures. It allows the participant to call upon experience, judgment, intuition and the tacit dimension of knowledge. It is a purely pedagogical or heuristic device, discussed in more detail below, but it points up to one of the main differences between the strategy of the strong and the strategy of the weak: the added dimension of thinking, almost as if the strong were thinking in two dimensions and the weak are thinking in three. There is also a quick and simple test to determine whether individual members of the armed forces practice it mètis, which is discussed below.

The possibility of more rigid habits of thinking is more common among large, successful, and affluent armed forces, as in all walks of life. Habitus is the system of durable, transferable dispositions produced by the conditioning associated with a particular class of conditions of existence. The conditions of existence produce generating, organizing principles of practice and of mental representation of situations, which can be objectively adapted in their aim, but without the awareness of those aims and the mastery explicit of the operations necessary to attain them. The more specialized the training, the more affluent and/or successful the people, the more resistance there can be to learning, the more rigid the way of thinking. Among the NATO armed forces, therefore, it would make it more like for the US armed forces to be held back by habitus than, say the Lithuanian forces. However, the habitus usually will become less rigid in times of crisis: the more severe the crisis, the more open people will become, and while it may be too late to help solve the crisis at hand, it is possible to introduce training at that time.[6]

III. Three Types of Learners of Mètis

In training people in strategy including mètis, you may expect three types of participants:

• the natural strategists: those who only need to have a new concept of strategy including the mètis explained to them, for them to identify it for themselves, learn how to improve their practice, and implement it immediately;
• those who will need to see the new concept of strategy including the mètis demonstrated to them, for them to identify it for themselves, learn how to improve their practice, and implement it immediately; and
• those who will need to be coached through a total of five or six applications (using case studies, for example) of a new concept of strategy including the mètis to them, for them to identify it for themselves, learn how to improve their practice, and implement it immediately.

In a range of people trained so far, there has always been a proportion of individuals who used strategy including mètis. There is no reason to think that NATO personnel would be an exception, although the proportion of those natural strategists is unknown. Moreover, the proportion of natural strategists among visible minorities, women, the disabled, and others with some sort of permanent disadvantage is much greater. If this also holds true for armed forces, then those who have made efforts at diversity may be receiving an unexpected dividend.

IV. The Proposed Training

The workshop proposed below takes about three hours, but it can be broken up. The follow-up necessary to train the third type of learner is not included. If the audience is already knowledgeable about counterinsurgency, then the second exercise can be skipped. The three exercises are: discovery and diagnosis, best practices for counterinsurgency, and development of the core idea, a heuristic device. The latter concept, the core idea is a metaphor at the heart of a strategy that will help a user to include mètis, i.e. to make, under pressure, decisions consistent with the broader goals and objectives. It forces the user into using a broader range of intellectual capacity than the rational, as well as being more holistic.

Exercise 1: Discovery and Diagnosis

This exercise takes one to one and a half hours. Its objective is to introduce the participants to the basics of strategy including mètis. The trainer asks participants to play a simple board game, such as checkers or chess. The materials required are simple: board games for every two or four participants, since the exercise works for people working in teams of two in playing the board game; pads of paper and pens; and either a chalkboard, a flipchart, an overhead projector or a document camera. The board game should be culturally appropriate and its rules common knowledge. The exercise allows for the use of translators if necessary. Once the matches are under way, gives participants a structured set of tasks of increasing complexity to force the failure of rational thought alone. The trainer then asks participants to come up with a core idea, and use it. The trainer observes participants and coaches them as necessary. What the trainer is looking for is the ability to predict outcomes in increasing numbers of scenarios, and the ability to think ahead to a much greater extent. People who can do this are likely to be natural strategists, and are much more likely to be practicing the strategy of the weak. The trainer confirms with participants when they are using mètis. At the close of this exercise, the trainer facilitates a discussion about the effectiveness of the first experience with a core idea. In the alternative, the trainer can assign the worksheet shown below, an integration learning tool commonly used in management or business

The integration diary helps the participant become aware of how they learn, so that they eventually become a better learner regarding counterinsurgency. The levels of abstract thought required increases as the integration diary progresses, so that it provides participants with an additional chance to telescope. Participants must complete the diary in point form rather than full sentences, to help them work with individual ideas and concepts, rather than being descriptive. The limited space forces participants to choose among various possibilities, and therefore learn what priorities on which to focus. There are no right or wrong answers. Below are specific instructions on how to fill in each box, from left to right.

Integration Diary

Topic of Report:	In my view the important components are:	Because:
Links with previous learning about strategic thinking:	My thoughts about this topic are:
I have a better understanding of:	I am more effective at:	I am more likely to:
I want to learn more about:	What I can use…	where?

Line 1, box 1: this is the specific aspect that the participant wishes to analyze in greater detail. There should be only one topic, for example: counterinsurgency, not ‘counterinsurgency and planning.’ The topic should be as specific as possible. The topic should also be at the same level of generality as the rest of the content of the worksheet.

Line 1, box 2: the participant should break down the topic of his/her choice into components. The participant repeats the process should continue until it is no longer possible to break the parts down. The participant then selects the components which will be discussed in the worksheet. Not all components will be analyzed.

Line 1, box 3: the participant gives the reasons why the components selected are important enough to continue to work with. Here the participant must select priorities once again, explicitly. This process occurs in everyday life, but it is not explicit.

Line 2, box 1: the participant must think over what s/he has learned about strategic thinking in the past, and identify how the topic under consideration connects with what s/he already knows. The participant then lists those connections.

Line 2, box 2: the participant will have a wide range of reactions to the learning that has just occurred. This box allows him/her to make those thoughts explicit, and also to provide him/her with the opportunity to set them aside for future consideration, if necessary. The participant will be less mentally encumbered and better able to continue the analysis.

Line 3, box 1: for the learning to be genuine, there has to be a greater comprehension of some, possibly several, phenomena. The participant is expected to provide at least one of these.

Line 3, box 2: if there is genuine learning, then the participant will change his/her behavior. Changes include improvements in existing behavior, variations in the probability that a particular action or course of action will be chosen. Even small changes are significant. The participant should list at least one change in behavior.

Line 3, box 3: if there is genuine learning, the participant will change his/her behavior. That behavior may be mental or psychological. For the learning to be genuine, there has to be a change in behavior. Sometimes that behavior is mental or psychological. Changes include improvements in existing behavior, variations in the probability that a particular action or course of action will be chosen. Even small changes are significant. The participant should list at least one change in probability.

In the last three boxes, the participant must identify specific advances based on what they have learned.

Line 4, box 1: earlier, the participant identified learning previous to the topic of the diary. Now, the participant identifies topics that s/he would like to learn about next.

Line 4, box 2: the participant selects the practical or immediate applications in his or her area of responsibility. First, the participant identifies the elements of learning that have immediate or known applications.

Line 4, box 3: the participant selects the practical or immediate applications in his or her area of responsibility. Now, the participant identifies areas of applications for the elements listed in the previous box. Participants ought to be as specific as possible.

Sample Integration Diary

Topic of Report: Telescoping	In my view the important components are: Levels of abstraction Changing levels of abstraction Obstacles to changing levels	Because: This is the crux of the task to be done This is the skill I have to learn or develop This is what I have to overcome
Links with previous learning about strategic thinking: Old definition of strategy Old definition of tactics	My thoughts about this topic are: Limits to what I can learn in a single day Why hasn’t mètis been discussed before anywhere?	Unsure of how much I can actually telescope Confused about the way I’m being trained here
I have a better understanding of: How this can help me understand insurgents	I am more effective at: Picking out fellow soldiers who can do this metis	I am more likely to: Take into account who is a strategic corporal and who isn’t when I plan
I want to learn more about: How insurgents think	What I can use… The test	where? With soldiers in my unit when we deploy

Exercise 2: Best Practices in Counterinsurgency

The second part of the training shifts the thinking towards the tactical advice that will need to be integrated once participants have discovered strategy including mètis. In this exercise, the list of successful and unsuccessful practices can be completed by having a discussion with participants and asking a set of structured, open-ended questions, either the Socratic method, or the method developed by Blake and Mouton.[7] Table 1: Best and Worst Practices in Counterinsurgency, is drawn from the work of Kalev Sepp. [8]

Table 1: Best and worst practices in counterinsurgency

Successful Counterinsurgency Practices	Unsuccessful Counterinsurgency Practices
Emphasis on intelligence	Primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency
Focus on population, their needs and security	Priority to ‘kill-capture’ enemy, not on engaging populations
Secure areas established, expanded	Battalion-size operations as the norm
Insurgents isolated form population	Military units concentrated on large bases for protection
Single authority	Special forces focused on raiding
Effective, pervasive psychological operations	Adviser effort a low priority in personnel assignment
Amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents	Building, training indigenous army in image of US Army
Police in lead, military supporting	Peacetime government processes
Police force expanded, diversified	Open borders, airspace, coastlines
Special forces, advisers embedded with indigenous forces
Insurgent sanctuaries denied

Sample Structured, Open-Ended Questions

• What are best practices you’ve used?
• What are the best practices you’ve read about?
• What are the best practices you’ve heard about?
• What are the mistakes you’ve make?
• What are the mistakes you’ve read about?
• What are the mistakes you’ve heard about?
• What should be your first priority?
• What should be your last concern?
• What do you need to be effective?
• Do you need to do anything with the local population? If so, what do you need to do?
• What do soldiers need short-term, to be effective?
• What do soldiers need mid-term, to be effective?
• What do soldiers need long-term, to be effective?
• Who makes decisions for military?
• Who makes decisions for civilians?
• Do you need more structures of authority?
• Do you need structures of authority?
• Do you need less structures of authority?
• What is the role for each structure of authority? Is that appropriate?
• What do you do with insurgents if you capture them?
• What do you want to do with your borders – land, air, sea?

Exercise 3: The Core Idea

The third exercise joins the evolving strategic thinking of participants with the content of the second exercise. Participants must plan a response to the events described in the semi-fictional case study (see the appendix), once without using a core idea, and a second time using one. In other words, participants must now use the information and skill to which they have just been introduced. The case study deliberately confuses the levels of abstraction. The participants use the two worksheets below to complete their assigned tasks. Participants may work in teams.

Worksheet: Strategy without core idea

Issue

Goal

Tactics 1. 2. 3. 4.

In this worksheet, the participant is expected to identify the components of a strategy to answer a particular challenge. As with the integration diary, the participant should use point form and only the space provided. The trainer can then assess participants’ judgment and their capacity to think using strategy with mètis. In Line 1, participants describe succinctly what is the problem. In Line 2, the participants describe the solution that suits them best. In line 3, the participants list the steps, actions, groups of actions or methods they use to reach the goal. Participant must be detailed, specific, succinct, and must stay at one level of generality or detail throughout the worksheet.

Below is a sample worksheet for a comparatively simple task, such as a patrol, having captured an insurgent, now sets up camp for one night.

Sample Worksheet: Strategy without Core Idea

Issue tired troops holding a prisoner in a hostile environment

Goal keep custody of a prisoner while still allowing for secure and rested troops, for one night

Tactics 1. identify most defensible location within accessible range 2. assign guard duty 3. assign perimeter guard duty 4. assign tasks re: setting up camp 5. other

Because coming up with a core idea is often the most difficult part of the exercise, there is a short worksheet that can be completed quickly that will stimulate the thinking of the participants.

Worksheet: Developing Core Idea Analogies, Models, Slogans

Category	Analogies	Your own analogies	Your own core ideas
Military	machine gun, rifle, tank
Geographical	river, waterfall, creek
Plant	tree, fern, Venus flytrap
Transportation	bus, golf cart, car
Sports	Caddy, gymnast, football
Mechanical	wrench, Allen key, ratchet
Insects	mosquito, ant, butterfly
Animals	cougar, puma, rhinoceros
Role models	Princess Diana, Donald Trump, Gandhi
Your own category:	Your own metaphors:

Here, the participant must start thinking in metaphorical terms about the tasks at hand. This worksheet is deliberately simple, to facilitate the focus needed for mètis. In completing this worksheet, the participant will see that not all metaphors are equally practical or helpful -- it is therefore useful to develop a number of them so that the participant can choose the best one. The present worksheet should be completed for the same sample task described above.

Sample Worksheet: Developing Core Idea Analogies, Models, Slogans

Category	Analogies	Your own analogies	Your own core ideas
Military	machine gun, rifle, tank	battalion, submarine, armored personnel carrier	Let’s guard the prisoner like it was our best weapon
Geographical	river, waterfall, creek	Mountain, plateau, desert	A 24-hour oasis
Plant	tree, fern, Venus flytrap	flower, tomato, potato	Let’s close up around the prisoner like one of those evening prayer plants
Transportation	bus, golf cart, car	Truck, walking, running, bicycle	Let’s make our break like a cruise ship for the night, and put the prisoner in the ship’s safe.
Sports	Caddy, gymnast, football	Soccer, tennis, ping pong
Mechanical	wrench, Allen key, ratchet	Silicone gun, screwdriver
Insects	mosquito, ant, butterfly	Bee, wasp, slug	Let’s circle around the queen bee
Animals	cougar, puma, rhinoceros	Tiger, lion, gazelle, turtle
Role models	Princess Diana, Donald Trump, Gandhi	Mother Theresa, Montgomery of Alamein
Your own category: jobs	Your own metaphors: Teacher, nurse, babysitter, accountant, bodyguard

Once the participant has chosen the best core idea for the task at hand, then s/he can develop a strategy using the worksheet below. . In Line 1, participants describe succinctly what is the problem. In Line 2, the participants describe the solution that suits them best. In line 3, the participants give the best core idea that was developed. In line 4, the participants list the steps, actions, groups of actions or methods they use to reach the goal. Participant must be detailed, specific, succinct, and must stay at one level of generality or detail throughout the worksheet.

Worksheet: Strategy with Core Idea

Issue

Goal

Core idea

Tactics 1. 2. 3. 4.

Here, the worksheet is completed as instructed above, save for the box on ‘Core Idea’, which should arise from the participant’s best efforts in the previous worksheet. Let us assume that the camp would need to either give greater rest or care to exhausted or wounded troops, or that there are particular supplies or equipment that requires protection. Those would be placed in the camp where they would be the most protected. Hence, the core idea adopted below would be: “Let’s circle around the queen bee” with the rest of the troops being the worker bees around the hive.

Sample Worksheet: Strategy with Core Idea

Issue tired troops in a hostile environment

Goal provide secure, safe and restful environment for troops for one night

Core idea let’s circle around the queen bee

Tactics 1. identify most defensible location within accessible range 2. assign guard duty 3. assign perimeter guard duty 4. assign tasks re: setting up camp 5. other

Learners of the third type should work on some additional case studies using the same worksheets.

Conclusion

Although the case study represents an adversarial situation, strategy need not be developed only in those circumstances. It can be used to rise to a challenge of any type. However, since it is a demanding way of thinking, users only resort to it in difficult situations. There are a number of caveats to the training proposed above. First, the workshop and training are, at the time of this writing, untried and untested in this proposed application. Second, the proportions of types of practitioners of mètis in the military is not known and the first type of learner may be found in much lower proportions than in other walks of life. Third, the training of troops proposed can be ordered, but the learning cannot. They may participate in the workshop while resisting the learning. Fourth, the people being trained are going to be primarily young men not given to introspection, to say nothing of abstract thought, and the habitus may proved an even greater obstacle than foreseen here. Fifth, the optimum effectiveness for this training is no doubt to have it integrated into the regular training, about which the author needs to know more.

Appendix: A New Kind of Warfare

In the following case study, participants must properly prepare a ground patrol for the environment described and its challenges, when the patrol will use troops new to counterinsurgency.

Let us assume that Al Qaeda has developed into the non-state equivalent of the counterintelligence state, using counterintelligence principles and practices in its strategy, and to organize, deploy, and fight.[9] Let us also assume that Al Qaeda is operationally distinctive in the following ways. First, it is obsessed with the extirpation of real or presumed threats, which generates the creation of unprecedented security and intelligence organizations. It is not concerned with the preservation of the lives of its members, only in its continued existence. Second, it has a millenarian ideology preaching fundamental change through the destruction of all existing evils and pursuing a totally new way of life. Third, it does not recognize the state's monopoly over armed violence.

Let us also assume that the war now has three fronts. In the first front, in Algeria, a terrorist leader who allied himself with Al Qaeda has been killed in a military sweep in mid-June. Nabil Sahraoui, head of the armed Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat whose decade-long aim has been to overthrow the Algerian government. The Salafist has waged a vicious terror campaign inside Algeria throughout the last 14 years, killing thousands. It is thought to have about 5,000 loyalists. Then, in early July, Libya found a Salafist camp in its southern desert and eradicated it. In northern Chad, Sahroui's successor, Amari Saifi was attacked, escaping the US led efforts only to be captured by Chadian rebels who control a patch of territory close to the Libyan border.

In the second front, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Tanzanian Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, who coordinated the August 1998 bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, was captured. Ghailani's laptop and cell phone generated leads for the capture of other Al Qaeda suspects of importance by Pakistan's military intelligence. That laptop also contained the files on proposed attacks on the New York Stock Exchange, and the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The Pakistani government revived the model of "Collective Responsibility" to motivate Pashtun tribal leaders into turning in Al Qaeda members. An important Pashtun member of Al Qaeda,was killed in a government drive in late June. Most of the action is taking place in Waziristan, where there are successful operations against a radical Sunni Cleric. Across the border, a Marine expeditionary unit conducted a successful sweep of a province which has been a major Taliban stronghold. Saif Al-Adel, a military planner for Al-Qaeda, reportedly trained terrorist recruits in handling explosives, and he helped train tribal fighters to attack the United Nations peacekeeping force in Somalia in 1993. A high-ranking member of the al-Qaeda network, he is believed to have taken over as military commander of the organization. Battle planning information from Chechnya, Somalia and the West Bank is now being shared across the network.[10]

The third front is in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East. There, the Crown Prince announced a thirty day amnesty for soft members to turn themselves in. Number 19 on a list of 26 wanted fugitives published by the Saudi government gave himself up, while another leader was killed himself after killing an American hostage. However, more than 85 police and civilians have died in Saudi in 13 months of violence. Jordan, Yemen, and other countries are reported progress and significant arrests, but hostile actors continue to move around the region, in Europe and in the US.

Let us also assume that instead of soldiers that can be identified, the hostile actor can be an armed militiaman, a well-hidden sniper, or even a 12-year-old armed with an AK-47 who threatens the troops. Let us also assume that there are increasing numbers of increasingly worrying incidents. For example, as she tries to control traffic at a checkpoint in an Iraqi city, a 23-year-old army sergeant from Virginia is shot dead after two people in a vehicle stopped and asked for medical help, then opened fire. As he walks guard patrol in an Iraqi town, a 19-year-old soldier from Owen Sound dies when a grenade thrown over a nearby explodes. An Army patrol of two tanks and two armored personnel carriers comes under fire in an ambush attack in an Iraqi town. Although no one was injured, soldiers saw an Iraqi girl only 12 years old armed with an AK-47.

There are also some key situations that must be avoided: the occupying forces must not alienate the general Iraqi population so much that it undermines the occupation or helps guerillas recruit; the occupying forces must not lose control of the countryside, which could destabilize the entire occupation; the occupying forces must be able to project force anywhere, despite guerrilla operations; and the occupation must not last long enough for the public back home to decide that it is no longer worth it to occupy the country at all. [11] Conditions of engagement are poor: the hostile actors are widely dispersed in formations that are largely undefined, the distinction between war and peace is fading, the conflict is nonlinear in its development, it is without definable battlefields or fronts, and it no longer distinguishes clearly civilians from military, combatants from non-combatants.

There are several major trends in violence that can be identified:[12] a strong Baathist remnant attacks the new security forces and assassinates government officials; international Al Qaeda hostile actors use suicide bombs to attack indiscriminately and use hostage-taking to force nations to withdraw from Iraq; a more general Iraqi nationalist campaign attacks US forces in particular, including young Sunnis seeking prestige, and some puritanical vigilantes against what they see as corrupting forces; major leaders and players in the Al Qaeda network are captured or killed; killing of hostages backfires to some extent, with Sunni and Shiite clerics issuing religious edicts against it. On the other hand, Iraqis continue to step forward in large numbers to serve their country. It is possible, but it cannot be assumed, that there will be mass Iraqi defections. Despite degradation, Iraqi forces have an urban warfare and cities are prepared for urban combat. Heavy equipment is in poor repair. Urban combat weapons like shoulder-launched SAMs, anti-tank weapons, automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, explosives and mines are in ample supply. There is one US loss for every 5 to 20 Iraqi opposition losses. Some guerrilla command and control targets could survive attacks.

Let us assume further that Iraqi special troops (fedayeen) use guerilla warfare tactics that have been developed by Al Qaeda and other radical Muslim militants in a number of countries. In particular, the idea of "stay-behind" irregular troops, dressed in civilian clothes and using unconventional and illegal tactics to attack U.S. and coalition forces, comes from evolving Al Qaeda and other terrorist doctrine.[13] Let us assume that Al Qaeda’s world view is that Islam in mortal danger from the West, and that jihad is a duty. They see the US as the new Moghuls, hostile to Islam, supporting local tyrants, but also as providing common hostile actor and basis for unity. Action will awaken, demonstrate, instruct, inspire, and bring about spiritual revival and foster unity. This is a powerful message whose appeal thrives on failure, humiliation, and anger. The objective is action, as oppose to strategic objectives dictating action.

The strategic characteristics of this hostile actor include: difficult terrain, uncertain allies, problematic identification of friend from foe, and experienced, underground, and hardened fighters.[14] Units are acting on mission-type orders; a decreased dependence on logistics support; more emphasis on maneuver; and psychological goals rather than physical ones. Their goal is the collapse from within of the hostile actor’s will to fight.[15] The insurgents have discovered that they can win the hearts and minds of the world's people through the selected use of real information, disinformation, manipulation of the press, propaganda, and other psychological warfare methods. Such psychological operations and propaganda programs will have increasing impact.[16] In urban areas, the insurgent works to disrupt industry and public services by strikes and sabotage; generate widespread disturbances designed to stress the resources of the opposing force; create incidents or massing crowds to lure the opposition force into a trap; provoke the opposing force into overreacting, as well as provoking inter-factional strife; snipe at roadblocks, outposts, sentries, and individuals; attack vehicles and buildings with rockets and mortars; plant explosive devices, either against specific targets or at random, to cause confusion and destruction, and to lower public morale; and ambush patrols and firing on helicopters.

Let us also assume that the hostile actors themselves have the following characteristics: they use standard military small unit tactics with assault, security, and support elements; they coordinate and communicate via hand-held FM radios; they use pick-up trucks to conduct raids/ assassinations, for example with shooters concealed in the bed of the truck; the security elements use motorcycles, not just assailants for drive by shootings and assassinations; they use explosives as they withdraw; they use vehicle horns to initiate explosives or to signal withdrawal; they plan and live-fire rehearse all actions in detail; they use procedures for prisoner handling from initial contact, to search and control, to execution; they use multiple man room entries, typically one or two 2-man teams in back to back position near the center of the room; they use distraction devices before room entry, such as lit fuses or improvised devices; they use multiple breach points into structures or individual rooms; they use paper targets and role players in rehearsals; and they show good muzzle awareness and control.

On the side of the armed forces, certain tactical principles have proven useful. Rigorous communications security is essential. Night operations are especially difficult. Tanks and armored personnel carriers cannot operate in cities without extensive dismounted infantry support. Trained snipers are very cost effective but in short supply. Patrolling is different from conventional combat patrolling and must be well coordinated. Fratricide is a serious problem because it is harder to identify friend from foe. Major civilian structures in cities (e.g., hospitals, churches, banks, embassies) are especially useful to urban defenders. Direct-fire artillery and anti-aircraft artillery can be valuable, provided one does not care about collateral damage. But collateral damage is used in propaganda. Small unit leadership is critical to tactical success. Recovering damaged armored vehicles is more difficult. Intelligence, especially from human sources, is absolutely critical. Hit-and-run ambushes by small groups are the favorite tactic. Tracked vehicles are preferable to wheeled vehicles in situations where there is likely to be large amounts of rubble in the streets. Otherwise wheeled armored vehicles are preferable. Helicopters have extreme difficulties operating in an urban combat environment, but are quite useful in redeploying forces and supplies to just behind the forward edge of operations. Soldiers’ equipment load must be dramatically reduced, but with emphasis on ammunition loads, medical supplies, and water.

Small arms play a disproportionately significant role. Individual flak jackets significantly reduce casualties. Smoke enhances survivability, but at a significant operational cost -- impedes visual communications, taxes driving skills of vehicle operators, slows the overall rate of advance. Mortars are highly regarded but may be less effective. Machine-guns may be more valuable than assault rifles. Air defense guns are valuable for suppressing ground targets. Heavy machine-guns offer good defense against close air attack, especially helicopters. Rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) are omnipresent, extensively used, and very effective. Expect extensive use. Armored vehicles require more protection and that protection needs to be distributed differently. Remotely piloted vehicles can provide real-time intelligence, but analysts have problems interpreting it. The hostile actor often employs home-made weapons, including chemical weapons. Lightly protected armored vehicles are of limited value in heavy urban terrain.

Combat engineering equipment, especially armored bulldozers, are critical assets. Cluster munitions are very effective, provided one is not concerned about collateral damage. Artillery-fired precision-guided munitions were seldom used. Bunker busting weapons can be invaluable.

Raids by hostile actors followed a standard pattern: they use covert entry and movement; any resisters or suspicious individuals are shot immediately; they segregate prisoners into manageable groups; they use selected prisoners in their posturing and statements for press; and all hostile actors plan to execute prisoners and then die themselves in place. They spend a lot of time training to carry out attacks the old fashioned way, with small groups of dedicated personnel equipped with little more than small arms. They are known to have used the following four scenarios. (1) Targeting law enforcement officers in ambush / assassinations. In this scenario, faked disabled vehicle with shooters concealed in trunk of car or bed of truck. When the officer stops his vehicle behind the disabled vehicle the driver blows the horn, initiating terrorist rifle fire from vehicle. Then the terrorist(s) deliver the final blow at close range. As they withdraw, they throw an explosive device into the law enforcement vehicle. Sometimes there is an over-watch element which fires on responding law enforcement officers. (2) Residential assassination. An innocuous-looking person with a concealed weapon knocks on the door of someone’s house. S/he stands in view of the peephole and answers questions from the resident through a closed door. When the resident opens the door the terrorist draws and fires. (3) Golf course assassination. While the victim is on the green, the terrorist fires a rocket propelled grenade at a vehicle adjacent to the green, then fires on victim with a rifle. (4) Compound kidnapping. The raid on the compound starts with a rocket propelled grenade attack on the guard shack, then on the primary building. Hostile actors then enter the building through multiple breach points through windows or after blowing up walls. After kidnapping the victim, they leave by truck, as motorcycle security element cover their withdrawal. Other scenarios include kidnapping someone off the street, using tunnels, storm drains, or sewers for attacking and withdrawing, rappelling from roofs to enter upper floors, and shots fired or grenades thrown from moving motorcycles.

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[1] Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines Magazine (January 1999).

[2] Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla War (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000); Giap Vo Ngyuyen, The Military Art of People's War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970); David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare/ Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964); Johan A Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife/Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (May-June 2005), 8-12, 10.

[3] Pierre Bourdieu, Le sens pratique (Paris : Minuit, 1980), p. 88.

[4] Marcel Detienne, Les ruses de l’intelligence (Paris: Flammarion, 1993), 124.

[5] Although daring, attempting such a correction is not without recent precedent.Philippe Nemo, What Is the West? (New York: Duquesne University Press, 2007).

[6] There is a third factor, of which I am aware, but which I have only begun to analyze, and which I will not address more than in the note: in the generation of people who grew up with access to the Internet and video games, I notice a difference in the ability to think abstractly, to take the initiative, and to concentrate for longer periods.

[7] Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton, " What's New With The Grid?" Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 16, No. 4, 41-46 (1979)

[8] Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (May-June 2005), 8-12, 10.

[9] Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Ruth Margolies Beitler, “Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in al-Qai’da’s Operations,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 8:2 (June 2004)

[10] Ib Faurby The Battle(s) of Grozny, Royal Danish Defence College, http://www.caucasus.dk/publication1.htm. A. Cordesman, The Second Intifada and the Lessons of Jenin Dealing with the Grim Realities of Urban Warfare, http://www.csis.org/features/second_jenin.pdf; F. Akers, Task Force Ranger: A Case Study Examining the Application of Advanced Technologies in Modern Urban Warfare, http://www.at.y12.doe.gov/ranger.pdf.

[11] George Friedman, Stratfor, June 18, 2004.

[12] Benjamin C. Works: Iraq, Al Qaeda and Fourth Generation Warfare, August 4, 2004

[13] Declaration of Jihad, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm; Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm; Sanders, K. "Iraqis deceive Marines at Nasiriyah," http://www.msnbc.com/news/890065.asp.

[14] id.

[15] G. Wilcox and G. I. Wilson, Military Response to Fourth Generation Warfare in Afghanistan,: http://www.attack.com/2002/4gw5may02.htm

[16] C. L. Erri, Asymmetric Warfare, the Evolution and Devolution of Terrorism; The Coming Challenge For Attack and National Security Forces, http://www.attack.com/asymetrc.htm.