Active Learning Through Classroom Role-Play

How to Use Simulation of National Elections for Upper-Year Comparative and International Politics Courses



Role play simulations have been extensively established in the literature for several decades (Woodworth and Gump, 1982; Walcott, 1976; Gould, 1979). In recent years, classroom role-play simulations have been used for Cabinet and budget processes in courses on Canadian Politics at University of Toronto, for determining foreign policy at Dalhousie University, for determination of future Canadian policy in Afghanistan by the Senlis Council, and in single class simulations in Comparative Politics at University of Delaware. The goal of this article is to propose a classroom exercise for an upper year university course in the Comparative Politics of industrialized states: the role-play simulation of a national election in a liberal democratic state. A simulation like this is extremely effective in teaching students about the domestic politics of foreign countries.

The theory and practice of comparative politics is often covered by a combination of lectures delivery and long form written work – essays, examinations, etc. A simulation exercise, on the other hand, presents all the advantages of active pedagogy, as well as covering some of the basic themes typically present in upper year courses in Comparative Politics. This article describes the simulation itself, outlines the content and concepts covered, explains how the simulation can be integrated into a twelve- or fourteen-week course, and specifies requirements to maximize student learning.

Example 1: Comparative Politics

General Requirements

In the format proposed, the instructor can select countries to be studied, or students can choose based on certain geographical restrictions. Most industrialized countries have ample news and scholarly coverage, especially since the explosion of electronic resources. While the students do not need to speak the language of the country chosen, information about the politics of that country needs to be available in a language that students understand.

To establish a threshold of basic knowledge, at the start of the simulation, students should be able to write a take home test covering the basics such as the main parties, their main platforms, the structure of the electoral system, and current and recurring political issues in the country. It is useful to have a professional librarian conduct a research workshop tailored to the assignment or test about two weeks before the deadline.

Teams of students are formed at random or on their own choices to represent the parties which hold seats in the legislature of the country, with individual students role-playing different party officials, including candidate, campaign manager, director of communications/media relations, director of finance/fundraiser, research cell member (including development of attacks on other parties, as well as tracking of attacks by other parties), and speechwriter.

During the simulation, students are encouraged to be as realistic as possible. If the class is large enough, it is possible to have students appointed as journalists, whose job is to write news reports using the tone and editorial bias of a media outlet of their choice for each class. Media or other role-players cannot invent incidents. The mock journalists would also be expected to produce other material as required from other students.

Simulation Details

The students are required to prepare for, and conduct, the major events of an election campaign such as has occurred or is occurring in the country under study, with each student playing the role of a different actor in the process: leader of a party, campaign manager, fundraiser, speechwriter, etc. The simulation includes the following tasks, which can be covered in eight classes over four weeks, assuming 1.5 hour classes:

• a campaign managers’ meeting to set timetables and parameters;
• an election call or campaign launch;
• one campaign speech;
• writing and/or production of two television/internet commercials, one less than one minute and one less than two minutes;
• one news conference;
• a one-on-one media interview; and
• an all-candidates’ debate.

Each of these tasks is designed to cover themes common in upper-year courses in Comparative (industrialized) courses. Team formation and selection of the party to represent familiarizes students with political parties. The campaign launch by the parties familiarizes students with the party platform. The planning of the mock election campaign familiarizes students with electoral systems, the legislative and executive branches of government, and any election laws or regulations. Media reports or interviews, if they occur, familiarize students with the role of the media in the politics of the country under study, as well as journalist, media consumer and voter behavior. Campaign speeches will ensure students are familiar with the most important political issues in the given election campaign or cycle. The leaders’ debate, which occurs in almost all liberal democratic countries, will show the brand of leadership for that country, as well as confirming students’ understanding of platform elements and extemporaneous speaking skills. Finally, the holding of the mock election itself reveals how the social cleavages and stratification will occur as represent by voting behavior. The instructor may devote entire classes to teamwork if required or possible, or the instructor may choose to intersperse lectures with the mock-election classes, providing information that the students can use in the next scheduled event. Another option is to use the simulation for that part of term where students are usually the least motivated, say in the latter half of a term.

Students can choose their roles within the political party apparatus of each party, or they can be assigned. The election campaign is usually a national one, so there has to be a party leader, as well as a campaign manager, someone responsible for election fundraising, spending and reporting, at least one speechwriter, a researcher who may be researching other parties’ flaws or embarrassing moments, a strategist, and a media relations specialist if there are media.

If there is media, then each class during the campaign starts with media reports. These take the form of brief written articles written in the style and tone of newspapers of the country under study. Next are the campaign events scheduled for that class, followed by some time for the professor to give feedback to students on the accuracy and realism of their performance, to highlight any particular characteristic of the politics of the particular country, and to assign tasks to particular teams to improve their performance. The teams are assessed either on their performance in class, evaluated in the same way a participation grade would be assessed. They can also be assigned analytical assignments that helps them put their learning into context, which would be marked like more traditional short-answer or longer form written assignments.

A sample campaign/classroom work schedule follows. Class 1 is Campaign Launch Day and consists of a short presentation by each group to introduce their party to the class. Class 2 is devoted to campaign speeches: the parties outline their positions on major issues and unveil their election platform. During class 3, students present a short (less than one minute long) political commercial. They may introduce themselves to the public or make pitch for a particular group of voters’ support. Each party leader faces the press during class 4. If there are no reporters appointed, the instructor asks the questions. Each party also has five minutes at the start to make a speech, show a commercial or otherwise add information to their platform. Class 5 is dedicated to one on one interviews between each of the party leaders and a member of the media. If there are no students acting as journalists, the instructor prepares and asks the questions. Class 6 is the time when the parties show their second, longer commercial. The leaders’ debate takes place during class 7, with the format being negotiated in advance by the campaign managers and the media or instructor. Finally, the vote is held on class 8, with the victory speech from the winning party. The instructor is free to remove an event or to change the order to suit the class schedule or to more closely follow events in the country being studied.




For each of these events, some rules of behavior to direct students’ behavior toward better learning, are provided. An alternative would be for the professor to assign the task of developing such rules to the campaign managers, or the class as a whole, depending on the class’ experience with active pedagogy. Rules for an all-party debate could also be developed this way. For example, here are some rules worked out by campaign managers for a simulated election in Germany. The instructor needs to approve all the rules outlined above, since students may reach agreements that take the pressure off their candidates.

Themes and Concepts Covered

The content of the simulation familiarizes the students with the domestic political systems of two liberal democratic countries with industrialized economies, while the simulation itself provides an active pedagogy increasing the odds of students learning in a way that allows better retention of material. Themes covered by the classroom simulation described below include elections, political culture, economic, social, and other domestic policies, political issues, political parties, media, electoral law and reform, some legislative and administrative processes, political structure, voting behaviour, and political cleavages. The role play simulation has the advantage of also expecting leadership roles from students in specific areas; of requiring reflection on students’ part for their classroom participation; of fostering independent critical thinking through the analytical assignments that accompany the simulation. It also presents the advantage of making fraud using the internet much more difficult. Not covered by the role play are theories and models, methodology, or debates in the field. These need to be covered in the classes not taken up with the role play simulation.

Example 2: The United Nations Security Council

The students are required to prepare for, and conduct, presentation of foreign policy issues for decision by the various organs. some procedures for presidency include: the member state introduces the resolution; other members ask questions of clarification or facts; member states state why they support or do not support the resolution; member states propose amendments; amendments can be accepted by the proposing member or voted on by all members; amendments are discussed; a vote is taken; votes may be taken repeatedly on a resolution after discussion; the member states options are: support, propose amendment, abstain, vote against. The member states who are permanent members veto the resolution if they vote against. France, the UK, the US, China and Russia have the right of veto.

All member states must post their resolutions 48 hours preceding their presentation. All member states must bring copies of their resolution to the day of the meeting. A Security Council resolution has three parts: a list of previous relevant resolutions; an explanation of the principles or reasons why the resolution is desirable; and an outline of the solution to the particular situation with numbered proposals. It is usually no more than two pages long. Student resolutions should include the relevant facts and the details of the situation. Student resolutions also need to include what students need to know to determine whether to support the resolution, propose amendments, abstain, or vote against the resolution. Resolutions for the last years can be found at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/, double-clicking on 'Resolutions' at the far left of the top of the screen.

The role-play simulation follows as much as possible the rules of the UN Security Council itself. With respect to the agenda, for example, the procedures are as follows. The Secretary-General shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council all communications from States, organs of the United Nations, or the Secretary-General concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. The provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the President of the Security Council. Only items which have been brought to the attention of the representatives on the Security Council in accordance with rule 6, items covered by rule 10, or matters which the Security Council had previously decided to defer, may be included in the provisional agenda. The provisional agenda for a meeting shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to the representatives on the Security Council at least three days before the meeting, but in urgent circumstances it may be communicated simultaneously with the notice of the meeting. The first item of the provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be the adoption of the agenda. Any item of the agenda of a meeting of the Security Council, consideration of which has not been completed at that meeting, shall, unless the Security Council otherwise decides, automatically be included in the agenda of the next meeting. The Secretary-General shall communicate each week to the representatives on the Security Council a summary statement of matters of which the Security Council is seized and of the stage reached in their consideration. The Security Council may, however, in urgent circumstances, make additions to the agenda at any time during a periodic meeting.

With respect to representation and credentials, the procedures of the UN Security Council are as follows. Each member of the Security Council shall be represented at the meetings of the Security Council by an accredited representative. The credentials of a representative on the Security Council shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before he takes his seat on the Security Council. The credentials shall be issued either by the Head of the State or of the Government concerned or by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Head of Government or Minister of Foreign Affairs of each member of the Security Council shall be entitled to sit on the Security Council without submitting credentials. Any Member of the United Nations not a member of the Security Council and any State not a Member of the United Nations, if invited to participate in a meeting or meetings of the Security Council, shall submit credentials for the representative appointed by it for this purpose. The credentials of such a representative shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before the first meeting which he is invited to attend. The credentials of representatives on the Security Council and of any representative appointed in accordance with rule 14 shall he examined by the Secretary-General who shall submit a report to the Security Council for approval. Pending the approval of the credentials of a representative on the Security Council, such representative shall be seated provisionally with the same rights as other representatives. Any representative on the Security Council, to whose credentials objection has been made within the Security Council, shall continue to sit with the same rights as other representatives until the Security Council has decided the matter.

With respect to the presidency of the Security Council, the procedures are as follows. The presidency of the Security Council shall be held in turn by the members of the Security Council in the English alphabetical order of their names. Each President shall hold office for one calendar month. The President shall preside over the meetings of the Security Council and, under the authority of the Security Council, shall represent it in its capacity as an organ of the United Nations. Whenever the President of the Security Council deems that for the proper fulfillment of the responsibilities of the presidency he should not preside over the Council during the consideration of a particular question with which the member he represents is directly connected, he shall indicate his decision to the Council. The presidential chair shall then devolve, for the purpose of the consideration of that question, on the representative of the member next in English alphabetical order, it being understood that the provisions of this rule shall apply to the representatives on the Security Council called upon successively to preside.

With respect to the secretariat and the Secretary General, the procedures of the Security Council are as follows. The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Security Council. The Secretary-General may authorize a deputy to act in his place at meetings of the Security Council. Each member shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Security Council. The Secretary-General, or his deputy acting on his behalf, may make either oral or written statements to the Security Council concerning any question under consideration by it. The Secretary-General may be appointed by the Security Council, as rapporteur for a specified question. The Secretary-General shall give to representatives on the Security Council notice of meetings of the Security Council and of its commissions and committees. The Secretary-General shall be responsible for the preparation of documents required by the Security Council and shall, except in urgent circumstances, distribute them in advance of the meeting at which they are to be considered.

With respect to the conduct of meetings, the procedures of the Security Council are as follows. The President shall call upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak. The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question. The President may accord precedence to any rapporteur appointed by the Security Council. The Chairman of a commission or committee, or the rapporteur appointed by the commission or committee to present its report, may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the report. If a representative raises a point of order, the President shall immediately state his ruling. If it is challenged, the President shall submit his ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled. Proposed resolutions, amendments and substantive motions shall normally be placed before the representatives in writing. Principal motions and draft resolutions shall have precedence in the order of their submission. Parts of a motion or of a draft resolution shall be voted on separately at the request of any representative, unless the original mover objects.

The following motions shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting: 1. To suspend the meeting; 2. To adjourn the meeting; 3. To adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour; 4. To refer any matter to a committee, to the Secretary-General or to a rapporteur; 5. To postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely; or 6. To introduce an amendment. Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate. It shall not be necessary for any motion or draft resolution proposed by a representative on the Security Council to be seconded before being put to a vote. A motion or draft resolution can at any time be withdrawn so long as no vote has been taken with respect to it. If the motion or draft resolution has been seconded. The representative on the Security Council who has seconded it may require that it be put to the vote as his motion or draft resolution with the same right of precedence as if the original mover had not withdrawn it. If two or more amendments to a motion or draft resolution are proposed, the President shall rule on the order in which they are to be voted upon. Ordinarily, the Security Council shall first vote on the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal and then on the amendment next furthest removed until all amendments have been put to the vote, but when an amendment adds to or deletes from the text of a motion or draft resolution, that amendment shall be voted on first. Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter. Any Member of the United Nations invited in accordance with the preceding rule, or in application of Article 32 of the Charter, to participate in the discussions of the Security Council may submit proposals and draft resolutions. These proposals and draft resolutions may be put to a vote only at the request of a representative on the Security Council. The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence. Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

Unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet in public. Any recommendation to the General Assembly regarding the appointment of the Secretary-General shall be discussed and decided at a private meeting. Subject to the provisions of rule 51, the verbatim record of each meeting of the Security Council shall be made available to the representatives on the Security Council and to the representatives of any other States which have participated in the meeting not later than 10 a.m. of the first working day following the meeting. The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within two working days after the time indicated in rule 49, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in the verbatim record. The Security Council may decide that for a private meeting the record shall be made in a single copy alone. This record shall be kept by the Secretary-General. The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within a period of ten days, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in this record. Corrections that have been requested shall be considered approved unless the President is of the opinion that they are sufficiently important to be submitted to the representatives on the Security Council. In the latter case, the representatives on the Security Council shall submit within two working days any comments they may wish to make. In the absence of objections in this period of time, the record shall be corrected as requested. The verbatim record referred to in rule 49 or the record referred to in rule 51, in which no corrections have been requested in the period of time required by rules 50 and 51, respectively, or which has been corrected in accordance with the provisions of rule 52, shall be considered as approved. It shall be signed by the President and shall become the official record of the Security Council. The official record of public meetings of the Security Council, as well as the documents annexed thereto, shall be published in the official languages as soon as possible. At the close of each private meeting the Security Council shall issue a communiqué through the Secretary-General. The representatives of the Members of the United Nations which have taken part in a private meeting shall at all times have the right to consult the record of that meeting in the office of the Secretary-General. The Security Council may at any time grant access to this record to authorized representatives of other Members of the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall, once each year, submit to the Security Council a list of the records and documents which up to that time have been considered confidential. The Security Council shall decide which of these shall be made available to other Members of the United Nations, which shall be made public, and which shall continue to remain confidential.

When it comes to the admission of new members, the procedures of the Security Council are as follows. The Secretary-General shall immediately place the application for membership before the representatives on the Security Council. Unless the Security Council decides otherwise, the application shall be referred by the President to a committee of the Security Council upon which each member of the Security Council shall be represented. The committee shall examine any application referred to it and report its conclusions thereon to the Council not less than thirty-five days in advance of a regular session of the General Assembly or, if a special session of the General Assembly is called, not less than fourteen days in advance of such session. The Security Council shall decide whether in its judgment the applicant is a peace-loving State and is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter and, accordingly, whether to recommend the applicant State for membership. If the Security Council recommends the applicant State for membership, it shall forward to the General Assembly the recommendation with a complete record of the discussion. If the Security Council does not recommend the applicant State for membership or postpones the consideration of the application, it shall submit a special report to the General Assembly with a complete record of the discussion. In order to ensure the consideration of its recommendation at the next session of the General Assembly following the receipt of the application, the Security Council shall make its recommendation not less than twenty-five days in advance of a regular session of the General Assembly, nor less than four days in advance of a special session. In special circumstances, the Security Council may decide to make a recommendation to the General Assembly concerning an application for membership subsequent to the expiration of the time limits set forth in the preceding paragraph.

Assessment and Facilitation

The main effort is in the design of the simulation and the enforcement of its rules. Once preparatory material is ready and the role play is launched, however, the instructor can focus on the proceedings themselves. While teaching, management and assessment strategies are up to individual instructors, I recommend the instructor use analytical assignments on the content of the simulation on an ongoing basis, and not assign more than 20% of the final grade for participation. I also recommend that students be graded by their performance as a group, so that the peer pressure and solidarity natural in this setting helps improve the performance. Students learn a great deal, driven in part by the desire to perform well in front of their peers, but also to win the election. There is also extensive learning from each other. While simulation is suitable for the classroom, it may be possible to adapt it to distributed learning. That said, the valuable face-to-face interactions that facilitate student understanding and retention would be greatly restricted using distributed or distance learning

My experience over several years of using this approach has been that I too learn a good deal about the domestic politics of foreign countries from the students, because the collective research capacity of the students exceeds my own. I do have to keep up on the most recent political developments in the country under study, since those issues tend to come up in the simulation. That is true if there are no students playing the role of journalists. On the other hand, not only are these simulations fun, students develop skills as well as knowledge, and motivation to work is never a problem. Those, however, are the usual benefits of active pedagogy.

References

Gould, Lawrence V., Jr. Scenario, Canada And The United European Community : A Simulation Exercise. Halifax, NS : Centre For Foreign Policy Studies, Dept. of Political Science, Dalhousie University, 1979.
Walcott, Charles. Simple Simulations : A Guide To The Design And Use Of Simulation/Games In Teaching Political Science. (Washington : American Political Science Association, 1976.;
Woodworth, James R. and W. Robert Gump, Camelot, A Role Playing Simulation For Political Decision Making, Homewood, Ill. : Dorsey Press, 1982.

How Smart Underdogs Think

How Smart Underdogs Think


The underdog is always thinking about what the strong are about to do – life and limb may depend on it.
The underdog is holistic. Since s/he cannot win a head-on confrontation, s/he has to find other ways of surviving
The underdog is always adapting. In order to survive, the underdog has to learn with every move.
The underdog plays a waiting game. Circumstances are not in his favor, so patience is a necessity in many situations.
The underdog is creative. The underdog’s means are limited, and usually dramatically more limited than the means available to others.
The underdog sees the big picture. The underdog is used to living and acting in a hostile and unpredictable environment. S/he developed the habit of seeing the context beyond his immediate circumstances.
The underdog is constantly scanning his environment for possible threats and for possible opportunities.
The underdog specifically designs each action to suit his strategy. The underdog sees the impact of every action, every tactics, on the whole picture, and takes all the potential consequences into account when s/he designs his/her tactics or actions.
The underdog is constantly forecasting for all events and all other actors, and invests in the development of even unlikely scenarios.
The underdog assumes s/he will lose any direct confrontation.
The underdog will break even his/her own rules of behavior in order to achieve his goal. This does not mean the underdog is immoral or dishonest; it means s/he has struggled to survive.
The underdog’s passions or passionate feelings are engaged.
Thinking like an underdog is not just when there is a problem; it is operating all the time, when looking for a job, doing housework, shopping. In some cases, they can be operating in an atmosphere of fear.

All of the differences in the way they think are summed up by the core idea. The core idea forces the use of more than the rational way most of us are taught in school. It calls on experience, judgment, intuition and everything else that has been learned in the past.

Laure Paquette, Ph.D.
Laure.Paquette@Lakeheadu.ca

Does Canada Have a Strategy in the Middle East and Why Should We Care? and The Uses of Underdog Strategy: Applications in International Security

Introduction

Canada used to matter a good deal more than it does now in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, at the creation of Israel, Supreme Court Justice Ivan Rand was the dominant member of UNSCOP, the United Nations Commission that recommended the partition of Palestine. At the United Nations, Lester Pearson was the key figure in passing the relevant resolution in the General Assembly.[1] But such is no longer the case. The contrast between Canada's current lack of diplomatic exertion in the Arab - Israeli conflict and its leadership in other areas, such as South Africa and Yugoslavia, is striking. And it is also true that Canada’s Western allies have not discouraged a more active Canadian role.[2] So what happened?

One explanation is that Canada cannot be everywhere. The flaw in that argument is that Canada participates in just about every peacekeeping mission. So why is it not active in other areas? Another explanation is that other conflicts that are more directly important to Canada. If that is the case, however, why did this not occur to Canadian foreign-policy makers after World War II, instead of later? A final explanation is that, as many observers have noted, “…a pro - Israel bias has diminished the effectiveness of Canada's policy in the Arab - Israeli conflict.” [3] As Kim Richard Nossal has pointed out, the position of Canada has always been that the people of the Middle East must come to terms with the existence of Israel. Another explanation, which this paper will argue, is that Canada has moved from pursuing a strategy to conducting strategic intervention, from trying to be one of the powers involved in trying to solve the conflict, it has come to focus on one particular aspect where it might have an influence. As we shall see, that aspect is the question of refugees. What the analysis concludes is that Canada would have an even greater impact if it focused its efforts about refugees, right now focused on women and children, to prevent radicalization of comparatively educated young men in the Gaza strip.

It is important from the start to set out some of the limits of this paper. First, it will look at the Arab-Israeli conflict, excluding such important issues as the Iraq war or the present situation in Afghanistan. Second, given the complications of the conflict, where every word can be value-laden and contested, I supplement my examination of Canadian policy made official by Foreign Affairs and International Trade as of October 2008 with neutral historical sources. Third and finally, I will examine the declaratory policy as well as initiatives for the years 2004 to 2008.

This paper is made up of four parts. The first looks for any strategy, first in Canada’s positions on various issues that make up the Arab-Israeli conflict, and then looks at the declaratory policy which is its expression. The second part looks for characteristics and mistakes typical of underdog strategy in this declaratory policy. The third part looks at the concrete initiatives, as opposed to only statements, and looks to see whether there is something more to add to the search for a Canadian strategy. It concludes by suggesting that the best next step to take is to refocus Canada’s concrete efforts to make it more strategic, more of a strategic intervention. Specifically, Canada’s programs for Palestinian refugees should also focus on deradicalization or the prevention of radicalization in the Gaza strip.

In order to follow the argument made here, it is necessary to define a few terms, which may not be familiar to readers. These terms are: strategy, tactics, underdog strategy, core idea, and strategic intervention. A strategy is an idea that orchestrates actions to reach a goal. Tactics are actions that make up strategy. Underdog strategy is a type of strategy: whereas strong-side strategy is concerned with reaching a goal, underdog strategy is a strategy that is an answer to the following questions: “What is the best thing you can do when you have no power and no money.” The characteristics of underdog strategy are capture by the core idea. For an underdog strategy, you need a metaphor, image or slogan that is intuitively clear to make all decisions in a complex or unpredictable or changing situation consistent: that is the core idea. Finally a strategic intervention is a particular type of tactic, one that answers the questions: “What is the best thing you can do, when you only have one chance?” in a crisis, or “How can I make a bad idea work?” outside a crisis situation.

We can now move to the first part of the argument, with a discussion of Canada’s declaratory policy.

Canada’s Declaratory Policy

Canada’s declarations on the Arab-Israeli conflict are made in a range of circumstances, such as reactions from Ottawa to particular events, or in speeches made at votes at the United Nations General Assembly. They are updated as events develop. With respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the statements focus on the following themes: support for Israel and its security, support for the Palestinians, support for a comprehensive peace settlement, statements on the status of Jerusalem, statements on settlements and the occupied territories, statements on Palestinian refugees, statements on terrorism, statements about UN resolutions, and statements about the barrier built between Israel and Gaza.[4]

Canada supports Israel's right to live in peace with its neighbors within secure boundaries and recognizes Israel's right to assure its own security. Canada recognizes that Israel has a right under international law to take the necessary measures, in accordance with human rights and international humanitarian law, to protect the security of its citizens from attacks by terrorist groups. Canada also recognizes the Palestinian right to self-determination and supports the creation of a sovereign, independent, viable, democratic and territorially contiguous Palestinian state, as part of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace settlement. Canada recognizes the Palestinian Authority (PA) as the governmental entity in the West Bank and Gaza, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the principal representative of the Palestinian people. Canada continues to support Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas. Canada considers that the 1993 Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Declaration of Principles continues to provide the basis for a comprehensive agreement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Canada also strongly supports the Quartet's Road Map, which sets out the obligations of both parties and steps for establishment of a Palestinian state, and the process launched by the Annapolis Conference. Canada also supports the Arab Peace Initiative as a potential basis for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement.

Canada considers the status of Jerusalem can be resolved only as part of a general settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. Canada does not recognize Israel's unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem. Canada believes that a just solution to the Palestinian refugee issue is central to a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that it must be negotiated among the parties concerned in the context of a final status peace agreement. Canada continues to focus international attention on improving the situation of the more than four million Palestinian refugees. Canada does not recognize permanent Israeli control over territories occupied in 1967 (the Golan Heights, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip). Canada considers that Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace. Canada recognizes Israel's right to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks, including through the restriction of access to its territory, and by building a barrier on its own territory for security purposes. Canada opposes expropriations and the demolition of houses and economic infrastructure carried out for this purpose. Canada condemns all acts of terrorism and terrorists should be brought to justice and prosecuted in accordance with international law. Canada has listed Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, and other groups as terrorist organizations. Canada supports UN resolutions that are consistent with Canadian policy on the Middle East are rooted in international law reflect current dynamics, contribute to the goal of a negotiated two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and address fairly and constructively the obligations and responsibilities of all parties to the conflict. Canada rejects one-sided resolutions and any politicization of the issues. Canada has long been concerned about the polemical and repetitive nature of many of the numerous UN resolutions.

Having considered the themes of Canada’s declaratory policy, we can now ask ourselves whether Canada has a strategy for the Arab-Israeli conflict. For Canada to have a strategy, it has to have a goal, a core idea and tactics. In this case, the tactics would be the various statements that Canada makes periodically. To do so, we can look at the various declarations arise from these policy positions. Tables 1 through 4 show the statements made by Canada and the events in the Arab-Israeli conflict for each of the yeas 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008.

Table 1: Declaratory Policy and Selected Contemporary Events, 2004

September	Israel assassinated Hamas leader Izz El-Deen Al-Sheikh Khalil in Syria
October: Minister Pettigrew renewed call to end violence in Israel and Gaza strip
November: PM statement on death of Arafat;	Syria announced that it was ready to renew negotiations with Israel over a peace treaty, without preconditions; Israeli-Egyptian relations improved
December Minister of Justice to visit the Middle East; statement in support of free and fair elections in West Bank and Gaza	Egypt released one Israeli and Israel six Egyptians; Egypt, Israel and the US signed a Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) treaty that would give Egypt trade advantages in the USA for cooperative ventures with Israeli participation; Egyptian Foreign Minister and intelligence chief visit Jerusalem.

Table 2: Declaratory Policy and Selected Contemporary Events, 2005

January: PM statement on election of new Palestinian Authority President	election of new Palestinian Authority President; National Religious Party left the Sharon government, unity government formed with Labor
February PM statement about end of Palestinian hostilities; Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke to the Israel-Canada Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Statement by Foreign Affairs Minister on the terrorist attack in Tel Aviv; Minister of Foreign Affairs to visit the Middle East; address by Minister of Foreign Affairs to London meeting	Abbas negotiated a truce agreement among Palestinians; Israeli and Palestinian leaders announced an end to the violence; Egypt and Jordan returned ambassadors to Israel; Intifada deemed over
March: Minister of Foreign Affairs urged Israel to abandon plan to expand West Bank settlement	the London Conference organized financial support for the Palestinian government; Palestinian militant groups met in Cairo and agreed to a lull in the fighting; Hamas and Islamic Jihad groups rejoined the PLO; Israel withdrew from Jericho, and Tulqarm; Israel and Palestinian Authority continued to catch militants planning attacks or smuggling arms; Al-Aqsa brigades fired on Abbas' headquarters in Ramallah; Israeli government accepted report on 20 to 30 illegal West Bank outposts; Palestinians upset by the advancing Israeli security barrier
April	Sharon and Abbas visited the POTUS; Palestinian attacks on Gaza settlements and Negev towns continued
May President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmud Abbas, visits Canada
June	Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that the sides had agreed to destroy the houses of Gaza settlers after Israeli withdrawal; Sharon and Abbas met in a long-awaited summit; violence flared following the summit, Israel launching air attacks against rocket launchers in Gaza and resuming its policy of targeted killings of Islamic Jihad terrorists; in Palestine, demonstrations and even armed attacks continued against the leadership.
July	Abbas invited the Hamas and Islamic Jihad to join a unity government; Islamic Jihad from Tul Karm suicide-bombed Netanya; IDF reoccupied Tul Karm, arrested several Islamic Jihad members and killed a Palestinian policeman who opened fire on them; Hamas in Gaza shot rockets fire on Gaza settlements and Israeli towns; IDF launched rocket attacks in Gaza and a manhunt for Hamas military leaders in Hebron area; battle between Palestine National Authority forces trying to restore order and Hamas members in Gaza
August Statement by the Prime Minister on the Gaza withdrawal	Israel evacuated Gaza settlements and four West Bank settlements; IDF killed 5 wanted Islamic Jihad men in Tul Karm
September PM welcomed Israel's pullout and pledged additional support for the Palestinian Authority	last Israeli soldiers left Gaza; settlements were officially handed over to Palestinians
December	President Ahmadi-Nejad calls for Israel to be "wiped off the face of the world," casts doubt on the historical authenticity of the Holocaust, suggests Jews should be moved to a homeland in Europe[5]

Table 3: Declaratory Policy and Selected Contemporary Events, 2006

January	Sharon ill, succeeded by Ehud Olmert; Hamas won 74 of the 133 seats in the Palestine Legislative Assembly, Fatah and PLO in opposition; EU and US leaders refused to deal with Hamas until it disarms and recognizes Israel
February statement on the situation in the Palestinian Authority
March: Canada committed to lasting peace in the Middle East; statement by the Prime Minister on Israeli election	new Palestinian Cabinet sworn in;[6] severe financial crisis; Kadima gained 29 seats in Israeli elections
April statement by Foreign Affairs Minister on bombing in Tel Aviv
June Statement by Minister Mackay on the Inclusion of Palestinian and Israeli National Societies into Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement; Minister Mackay Expresses Concern Over Situation in the Gaza Strip	fighting between Hamas and Fatah broke out, including killings and kidnappings of officials; almost 1000 Palestinian rockets hit Israel; Israel continued arrests and targeted killings of terrorist leaders; Hamas attacked an Israeli border outpost, killing 2
July	Hamas rockets were fired against Israel throughout Hezbollah conflict[7]
August	with cease-fire negotiations at an impasse, Israeli troops advanced 30 km inside Lebanon; fighting stopped 14th
November: Canada expressed concern over the escalation of violence in the Gaza Strip and the civilian casualties; Canada applauded the General Assembly’s expression of serious concern about the deteriorating human rights situation in Iran	IDF operations in Rafah uncovered extensive tunnels used for smuggling; negotiations for the return of Gilad Shalit stalled; Palestinians and Israelis announced a surprise truce; Syrian offer to negotiate peace "without conditions" rejected because of continuing Syrian support for terror groups
December	Olmert met with Abbas and announced release of frozen funds, removal of some checkpoints, weapons transfer for Fatah); renewed violence between Palestinian factions; Gaza schools closed in the rising violence

Table 4: Declaratory Policy and Selected Contemporary Events, 2007

January: Foreign Minister visit to the Middle East; demonstrated importance of relationships in the Middle East, commitment to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace
May: Foreign Minister concerned by ongoing rocket attacks on Israel
June	serious fighting between Hamas and Fatah; Israeli newspapers flooded with Gaza faxes begging Israel to re-take Gaza; Fatah police arrested Hamas officials, militants and terrorists
July Canada provided support to the new Palestinian government
November: Canadian trade mission to the Middle East; statement on Annapolis Conference; Canada supported Palestinian reform and development;	Annapolis conference led to commitment by Abbas and PM Olmert to negotiate peace by end of 2008; low-level Syrian delegation concerned with Golan Heights had been placed on the agenda;[8] sharp decline in Hamas popularity
December Canada announced a commitment of $300 million over 5 years towards improving Palestinian security, governance and prosperity

Table 5: Declaratory Policy and Selected Contemporary Events, 2008

January	Rocket attacks continued. Israel curtailed travel, energy, and entry of goods to and from Gaza; Hamas shut down the Gaza power plant, which provides 20% of the electricity; Egypt closed the border breach partially, and then resealed it.
February	an Israeli missile strike killed 5 Hamas terrorists; Hamas launched 30 Iranian rockets; Israel launched a large scale raid
April: Minister Bernier condemned attack on delegation visiting Sderot; expressed concern about death threats against Shirin Ebadi	Israel removed a number of checkpoints in the West Bank and allowed Palestinian forces to enter Jenin
June Canada reaffirmed support for Palestinian reform	Hamas-Israel lull; Israel claimed the truce covers arms smuggling; Israel swapped Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners for the bodies of the kidnapped soldiers from the Second Lebanon War

In other words, events are greeted and welcomed and deplored… from Ottawa. As we can see, there is no explicit goal in these statements, nor is there an explicit core idea. So we can conclude there is no strategy for the period studied, as far as the declaratory policy is concerned. But are there any elements of an underdog’s strategic thinking? This is where the analysis gets interesting. Underdog strategic thinking has certain characteristics, and here we find some evidence that Canada’s declaratory policy possesses them. Table 6: Characteristics and Canadian Policy, provides a summary.

Table 6: Characteristics and Canadian Policy

Underdogs are always thinking about what the strong are about to do.	Yes; Canada thinks about the US all the time in its foreign policy
The underdog is holistic.	Yes; in its foreign policy, Canada has put great emphasis on multilateral areas, to compensate for the heavy influence of the US i.e. paid up at the UN, participates in NATO
The underdog is always adapting.	No; Canada hasn’t changed in years in terms of its declaratory game. It makes declarations whether there is a crisis or not, viz. the current military operation in Gaza in Jan 2009, just ahead of the Obama inauguration and the Israeli election.
The underdog plays a waiting game.	No evidence either way
The underdog is creative.	No; there is not much originality or creativity, but there has been consistency; holier than thou, viz. East Timor crisis and withdrawal of ambassador from Indonesia, along with Netherlands and Sweden only.
The underdog sees the big picture.	Yes; Canada can fairly been accused of Atlanticism i.e. thinking only of north America and western Europe for all these years. Viz. the literature which is extremely limited, not just re: middle east, but in general.
The underdog is constantly scanning his environment.	No; Not with the size of military we have.
The underdog specifically designs each action to suit his strategy.	No; The declaratory phase is without forethought, it would appear.
The underdog is constantly forecasting for all events.	No; That would be absent or else the participation of Canada would be different.
The underdog assumes s/he will lose any direct confrontation.	No, since there is NATO behind us.
The underdog will break even his/her own rules of behavior in order to achieve his goal.	No, Canada is generally holier-than thou.
The underdog’s passions or passionate feelings are engaged.	No; Canada is not passionately committed to anything. On the contrary we are rather middle of the road.
Thinking like an underdog is not just when there is a problem.	No; Canada operates in an atmosphere of great prosperity and security.

So there is evidence of four underdog characteristics in Canada’s more general foreign policy, although none that are specific to the policy in the Middle East.

Underdog strategic thinking can also be identified by its typical mistakes. Here again, as summarized in Table 7, Typical Mistakes and Canadian Policy, we find partial evidence.

Table 7: Typical Mistakes and Canadian Policy

Not keeping things simple and honest.	No: The refugee program could hardly be simpler.
Going against, instead of with, the flow of events.	No. Canada is not doing enough to be going against the grain or ruffling any feathers.
Ignoring the need to wait, rushing headlong into action.	No, I believe Canada is thoughtful, although the jury is out about Afghanistan
Ignoring the unintended consequences of your actions.	No evidence either way
Working on the wrong problem.	Yes. Canada has not correctly identified the causes of the conflict, and therefore is ineffective
Not specifying their objectives enough	yes
Not developing enough alternatives.	Don’t know; hard to say what is in policy-makers minds
Giving inadequate thought to tradeoffs.	No; inadequate thought to what could be gained, or a contribution worthy of being made
Disregarding uncertainty.	No; disregards that doing nothing is also a decision
Failing to account for your risk tolerance.	No; risk tolerance is very low, probably a major factor in decision-making.
Failing to plan ahead when decisions are linked over time	No
Not trusting your intuition.	No

So we have evidence that there is some underdog strategic thinking in Canadian foreign policy in general, but no evidence that there is a strategy in the declaratory policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. So what is Canada doing?

The reader will recall the definition of strategic intervention given in the introduction to this paper. We can investigate whether Canada is using a strategic intervention, i.e. a tactic well-crafted from the standpoint of the big picture in a highly complex situation. We can investigate whether there is a strategic intervention by reviewing the initiatives, as opposed to the declarations, taken by Canada in the Arab-Israeli conflict for the same period. These are almost all in the area of refugees. In this area, Canada has been quite active. It participated in international refugee-related working groups. It relocated Palestinian refugees from a camp in the Sinai back to Gaza. It provided Palestinian women in Lebanon with scholarships. It funded innovation in small non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) in the area. And it stated that any lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East must include a solution for refugees. Canada supports research and activities that aim to improve understanding of the core refugee issues.

These initiatives were preceded by active engagement on Canada’s part. Before 2000, Canada held the chairmanship of the Refugee Working Group in 1992, and participated in it until its suspension in 1996. This working group organized four formal missions to refugee camps between 1994 and 1999. It also participated in similar missions to refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria. The goal here was to highlight the complexity of the problems and their urgency. It recently renewed an international dialogue on the issue through the Refugee Coordination Forum. Canada also funded a program to relocate Palestinian refugees from Canada Camp in the Sinai to Gaza between 1994 and 2000. All Palestinians in Canada Camp are now back in the Gaza strip.

More than 200 women from Palestinian refugee communities in Lebanon have received scholarships from this fund to pursue local undergraduate university degrees and develop professional and management skills in such sectors as business, engineering, biology and science. The fund is managed by the International Development and Research Centre on behalf of the Canadian International Development Agency. The Canada Fund is a development program administered by Canadian missions in the region which aims to assist non-governmental organizations to carry out small innovative development projects.

So compared to the declaratory policy, these contributions have been of more practical significance. While there are many themes in declaratory policy, there is only one area where there is activity, that of the refugees, an area where Canada has considerable expertise, and has acted with distinction. And it meets the requirements of a strategic intervention. To design a strategic intervention instead of a strategy, it is necessary to look at the other parties’ actions and instead of creating a strategy, to reverse engineer the best tactics that can be designed. This can be done by identifying the do-or-die moments, by determining who are the significant political actors in the country, individuals or groups, by distinguishing between significant and insignificant actors, by examining what influence various actors have on a particular action, by determining which resources support the political system, which are scarce, and which are essential, by looking at how political actors manage them, what factors favor which political actors. The latter questions are also asked of tactics, actors, resources, rules. Only then can a response be designed, a response much more likely to have an impact.

That analysis reveals that in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the key to the rest of the peace negotiations really are the refugees. I.e. the Palestinians who became concentrated in Gaza and the West Bank. Since the Palestinian populations migrated in the course of several conflicts, their status and condition has been the primary source of international concern and attention paid by the international community. And Canada was building on one of its strengths. It is also suited to the moderate type and amount of resources Canada has been willing to commit. So Canada got the right answer, and took the right course of action. Instead of a larger-scale commitment such as was more probable after World War II, we see here a smaller scale commitment, but one which focuses on a key issue. If we are to continue with this effort, however, we need to focus even more. But if Canada’s actions are both effective and wise so far, does the foregoing analysis propose any further way to improve? Certainly, if Canada does not want to become a major player and implement a strategy in the Middle East, and there are no signs that it does, then it should at least conduct a strategic intervention.

Conclusion

If Canada wants to go one step further and maximize the impact of its initiatives, then I propose that it should focus on preventing radicalization of the Palestinian population. This is happening primarily in Gaza, and primarily to young men of comparative education. The next focus should be meaningful occupation, i.e. employment for these young men, who may have already have contacts with radical elements.

This paper began with an examination of Canada’s position on various issues that make up the Arab-Israeli conflict, as discovered through its declaratory policy. The evidence regarding strategy was contradictory, with no evidence of a core idea but some evidence of underdog strategic thinking. An analysis of Canadian initiatives revealed evidence that there was a strategic intervention occurring, specifically with regard to the refugees in the area. Having moved from pursuing a strategy to conducting strategic intervention, from trying to be one of the powers involved in trying to solve the conflict, Canada has come to focus on one particular aspect where it might have an influence, on the question of refugees. Canada would have an even greater impact if it focused its efforts about refugees, right now focused on women and children, to prevent radicalization of comparatively educated young men in the Gaza strip. Strategic intervention provides the tools necessary to design such programs to maximum inventiveness.

---

[1] Ann Hillmer, "'Here I am in the Middle,' Lester Pearson and the Origins of Canada's Involvement in the Middle East," in David Taras and David Goldberg, The Domestic Battleground: Canada and the Arab - Israeli Conflict (Kingston: McGill - Queen's University Press, 1989).

[2] Peyton Lyon. “The Canada Israel Committee and Canada's Middle East policy,” Journal of Canadian Studies 27:4 (Winter 1992), 5ss.

[3] Peyton Lyon. “The Canada Israel Committee and Canada's Middle East policy,” Journal of Canadian Studies 27:4 (Winter 1992), 5ss.

[4] http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/middle_east/can_policy-en.asp, 2008-05-26.

[5]Keesing's Record of World Events 51 (December 2005), 46906.

[6] Keesing’s Record of World Events, 52 (February 2006), 47175-76.

[7] Keesing's Record of World Events 52 (July 2006), 47392-3 and 47342-43.

[8] Keesing's Record of World Events, 53 (November 2007), 48277.

Revitalizing Strategy Thinking

The Uses of Underdog Strategy in International Security

Laure Paquette, Ph.D.

Lakehead University

Associate Fellow

Joint Special Operations University

United States Special Operations Command

Université Laval

8-10 May 2009

Centuries ago, Aristotle explicitly excluded from philosophical discourse mètis, the way of thinking of women and the vanquished.[1] Various Aristotelian revivals have encouraged that exclusion since, including that of the Renaissance.[2] It has had many consequences, but for the study of strategy, it has meant that its theory and practice quickly became restricted first to the study of victors. However, the practice of mètis, the strategy of the weak and powerless, did not disappear. This paper argues in favour of returning it to scholarly discourse in International Security by providing several different applications in the field. The present significance of reintroducing the mètis are obvious, both the fight against terrorism, and for the challenges posed by counter-insurgency in both Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the mètis, or, as I have called it in my previous publications, underdog strategy, has uses and significance far beyond the immediate problems of international security.

In order to follow the argument made here, it is necessary to define a few terms, which may not be familiar even to scholars of international security. These terms are: strategy, tactics, underdog strategy, core idea, and strategic intervention. A strategy is an idea that orchestrates actions to reach a goal. Tactics are actions that make up strategy. Where strong-side strategy is concerned with reaching a goal, underdog strategy tries to answer this question: “What is the best thing you can do when you have no power and no money?” The characteristics of underdog strategy are captured by the core idea. For an underdog strategy, you need a metaphor, image or slogan that is intuitively clear to make all decisions in a complex or unpredictable or changing situation consistent. That is the core idea. The three main characteristics of underdog strategy, captured by the core idea, are: they are more holistic, they change their scope much more easily, and they use a greater range of tactics much more easily. Finally a strategic intervention is a particular type of tactic, one that answers the questions: “What is the best thing you can do, when you only have one chance?” in a crisis, or “How can I make a bad idea work?” outside a crisis situation.

The core idea of a strategy promotes the use of analogical thinking. Analogical thinking is one of those cognitive devices that are mental short-cut for making decisions, large and small, and we all use them in every day life. Using analogies for decision making or problem solving simply means this: we ask ourselves if we have ever encountered this situation before, and try the solution that worked before. Analogical thinking is recommended for emergency responders, among others, in highly complex, uncertain situations.[3] But it has spread beyond that sphere. “In one of the more unlikely collaborations of modern medicine, Britain’s largest children’s hospital has revamped its patient hand-off techniques by copying the choreographed pit stops of Italy’s Formula One Ferrari racing team. The hospital project has been in place for two years and has already helped reduce the number of mishaps.”[4] This has also been true for US hospitals. “A growing number of health care providers are trying to learn form aviation accidents and, more specifically, from what the airlines have done to prevent them. In the last five years, several major hospitals have hired professional pilots to train their critical-care staff members on how to apply aviation safety principles to their work…it is well established that, like airplane crashes, the majority of adverse events in health care are the result of human error, particularly failures in communication, leadership and decision-making.”[5] Outside the delivery of health care, there have been interesting results. In a trial for a company with a high speed robotic assembly line, it took the algorithm for the waggle dance of bees identifying nectar location (developed by Cardiff University’s Manufacturing Engineering Centre) just a few days to identify the most efficient way to run the machines, much faster than a more conventional program.[6] There has been structurally analogous thinking in the military sphere, going back to the Duke of Wellington.[7] And the study of emergency responders using intuitive methods of decision-making, including military people, is also established.[8] This author has also used the capacity for analogous thinking as a diagnostic test in assessing potential for effective counterinsurgency training in the Canadian Forces reserves. But adopting underdog strategy may well be required in order for military personnel if they are to learn to think like terrorists or insurgents. For regular armed forces, it means changing their defensive ways of thinking. Right now, they try to maneuver the enemy so that their advantages will be decisive. But in complex environments, the enemy avoid meeting in a decisive engagement, which they are convinced they will lose. They will attack the weak points, not the strong points, and are willing to wait because it is not being decimated.[9] This is just one of many differences between strong-side and underdog strategy.

This paper will explore several applications of underdog strategy in international security. First, there are two applications to show the analytical potential for what were problems with new urgency: identifying characteristics of underdog strategy in an insurgency, and identifying common mistakes of underdog strategy made by terrorists. Then I turn to government responses: the proposal for a strategic intervention, and how a government might deal with an insurgency. Finally, there is an application to military training, identifying the strategic corporal.

There are several other applications which are not covered by this paper, but which are mentioned in the conclusion.

Underdog Characteristics and Military Operations: US Defeat the Taliban, 2001

For the most part, governments, groups, and individuals using underdog strategy share many of the same characteristics. These characteristics are meant to be relative: all countries, for example, can expect to be aware of what greater powers around them are doing, but underdogs devote more energy and time to such a consideration. The identification of the characteristics was made through direct observation of individuals and groups. (The analytical framework, on the other hand, was primarily developed for and applied to states and governments.) The characteristics are:

1. Underdog strategists are more aware of what the stronger groups or governments may do.

2. Underdog strategists are always adapting.

3. Underdog strategists are much more likely to play a waiting game.

4. Underdogs are more creative, because their means are so limited.

5. Underdog strategists are more holistic.

6. Underdog strategists spend more time scanning the environment for possible threats and opportunities.

Table 1: Evidence of Characteristics of Weak-Side Strategy

Characteristic	Taliban insurgents
They are always thinking about what the strong are about to do	Opium traders moved to Nimroz from Helmand because it was more weakly policed
They are always adapting.	Changed from regular warfare to assassinations and kidnappings, insurgency, suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices, financing by opium trade.
They play a waiting game.	Took time to regroup after losing control of country
They are creative.	Adopting the method of roadside bombs, imported from the Iraq insurgency; opium traders exploit harsh terrain, easy corruption of officials, poverty of the population
They are holistic.	Abandoned goal of military victory over ISAF; now targeting unwillingness of domestic NATO populations, using unanswerable methods
They are always scanning their environment.	Quickly identified the poverty of farmers as a possibly way to exert power over them
They specifically design each action to suit their strategy.	--
They are always forecasting for all events.	--
They are convinced they will lose a direct confrontation.	Gave up regular warfare; did not compete in elections
They will break their own rules.	Banned opium when in power, relied on opium trade as insurgents
Their commitment is complete.	willing to fight on despite facing a much more powerful enemy

7. Underdogs are more likely to design each action specifically to suit their strategy.

8. Underdogs are much more likely forecast for even the unlikeliest tactic and scenario.

9. Underdog strategists usually assume they will lose any direct confrontation.

10. If the situation gets bad enough, underdog strategists are much more likely to break their own rules of behavior.

11. Underdog strategists are usually much more (even passionately) committed.

In the case of the Taliban defeat at the hands of the US in 2001, we find the following evidence for each of the characteristics.

Common Underdog Mistakes: Terrorism 1986-2002

Mistakes terrorists make are in their reasoning and/or planning, which is difficult to document when they are successful, and difficult to document after their failure, since that usually means death or capture. Moreover, what can be discovered after their defeat, the information is not always completely available in a timely way in open sources. It is therefore no surprise that some mistakes cannot be illustrated.

The mistakes are:

1. Working on the wrong problem.

2. Not specifying their objectives enough.

3. Not developing enough alternatives.

4. Giving inadequate thought to tradeoffs.

5. Disregarding uncertainty.

6. Failing to account for your risk tolerance.

7. Failing to plan ahead when decisions are linked over time.

8. Not trusting your intuition.

9. Not keeping things simple and discreet.

10. Going against the flow of events.

11. Ignoring the need to wait, rushing headlong into action.

12. Ignoring the unintended consequences of your actions.

Table 2: Evidence of Strategic Mistakes by Terrorists

Type of Mistake	Terrorist Group and Action
Not Keeping Things Simple, Honest, Moderately Discreet	JEM collected funds through donation requests in magazines and pamphlets (assets seized by Pakistani government); Kahane Chai declared terror organization by Israel after it supported a Feb. 1994 attack on the al Ibrahimi Mosque; FARC’s internal politics, statutes defining the structure (squad, guerrilla, company, column, fronts, block of fronts, central high command); Tamil Tigers’ newspapers, press and propaganda section, political wing, research and development wing, and intelligence wing.
Ignoring The Need To Wait, Rushing Headlong Into Action.	Al Qaeda, Khalid Shaikh Mohommad had to introduce “losing and learning” doctrine, i.e. only a defeat if nothing is learned and mistakes repeated
Working on the Wrong Problem.	MEK expelled from Iran in 1979 for being Marxist, then perpetrated anti-Western attacks; Salafist Group for Call and Combat gained popularity through pledge to avoid Algerian civilians, then attacked them anyway
Failing to Plan Ahead When Decisions Are Linked Over Time.	Hizbollah repeatedly kidnapped Israeli soldiers or civilians; In 2006, kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers brought Israeli armed response
Not Specifying Their Objectives Enough.	Islamic Group of Egypt split into a faction supporting a ceasefire and a faction wanting to carry out attacks on US and Israeli interests; General Command of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine split from the rest of the Popular Front in 1968, wanting to fight more and politick less; Al Qaeda’s Kalid Shaikh Mohommad has to move from government, hard targets in Southeast Asia for soft targets like the Bali nightclub on October 12, 2002; FARC actual aims versus official, ideological struggle
Not Developing Enough Alternatives	Cease-fires used as stalling tactics by Hizbollah, IRA
Giving Inadequate Thought To Tradeoffs	Move from Marxism to nationalism to Islamism of PKK; move to enlarged campaign of violence in 1993; Sudanese walk-in from Al Qaeda over embezzlement, low pay; use of kidnapping, robbery and extortion by ETA for money, instead of bombings and assassinations of officials for political reasons; FARC turned to terrorism after political failure; got into narcotics smuggling for money; Abu Sayaf Group, Islamic separatists in south Philippines, uses kidnapping, bombings, assassinations, and extortion for money; its numbers, over 1000 in 2002-2001, now motivated by money rather than extremism
Disregarding Uncertainty	Discomfiture of Shining Path, JVP, Aum Shimkyo, and PKK after capture of leaders
Failing To Account For Your Risk Tolerance.	Kalid Shaikh Mohommad, third in command of Al Qaeda, used layers of operatives between himself and organizers to protect himself; Leader of the LTTE murdered several of his own commanders for suspected treason, wore a cyanide capsule around his neck in case of capture; captured leaders of PKK and JVP begged not to be tortured

Proposal for Strategic Intervention: Canadian Policy in the Middle East, 2000-2008

This application argues that the best next step to take is to refocus Canada’s concrete efforts to make it more strategic, more of a strategic intervention. Specifically, Canada’s programs for Palestinian refugees should also focus on de-radicalization or the prevention of radicalization in the Gaza strip.

The first step is to answer the question: are there any of the characteristics or typical mistakes by which one recognizes the underdog in Canada’s foreign policy in the Middle East? Table 3: Characteristics and Canadian Policy, provides a summary.

There are only four characteristics to which Canada’s foreign policy generally corresponds, and none specifically for its work in the Middle East. Turning now to the typical mistakes an underdog makes, another way of identifying underdog thinking, we find that there are only two mistakes they typically make. The results are summarized in Table 4: Typical Mistakes and Canadian Policy.

We can now turn now to the question of strategic intervention: I begin by reviewing the initiatives by Canada, which are almost all in the area of refugees. Here at least, Canada has been active in more than public statements. There are several mains actions in this area. First, Canada participated in international refugee-related working groups. Second, it relocated Palestinian refugees from a camp in the Sinai back to Gaza. Third, it provided Palestinian women in Lebanon with scholarships. Fourth, it funded innovation in small non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) in the area. Finally it stated that any lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East must include a solution for refugees. Canada supports research and activities that aim to improve understanding of the core refugee issues.

Table 3: Characteristics and Canadian Policy

Underdogs are always thinking about what the strong are about to do.	Yes; Canada thinks about the US all the time in its foreign policy
The underdog is holistic.	Yes; in its foreign policy, Canada has put great emphasis on multilateral areas, to compensate for the heavy influence of the US i.e. paid up at the UN, participates in NATO
The underdog is always adapting.	No; Canada hasn’t changed in years in terms of its declaratory game. It makes declarations whether there is a crisis or not, viz. the current military operation in Gaza in Jan 2009, just ahead of the Obama inauguration and the Israeli election.
The underdog plays a waiting game.	No evidence either way
The underdog is creative.	No; there is not much originality or creativity, but there has been consistency; holier than thou, viz. East Timor crisis and withdrawal of ambassador from Indonesia, along with Netherlands and Sweden only.
The underdog sees the big picture.	Yes; Canada can fairly been accused of Atlanticism i.e. thinking only of north America and western Europe for all these years. Viz. the literature which is extremely limited, not just re: middle east, but in general.
The underdog is constantly scanning his environment.	No; Not with the size of military we have.
The underdog specifically designs each action to suit his strategy.	No; The declaratory phase is without forethought, it would appear.
The underdog is constantly forecasting for all events.	No; That would be absent or else the participation of Canada would be different.
The underdog assumes s/he will lose any direct confrontation.	No, since there is NATO behind us.
The underdog will break even his/her own rules of behavior in order to achieve his goal.	No, Canada is generally holier-than thou.
The underdog’s passions or passionate feelings are engaged.	No; Canada is not passionately committed to anything. On the contrary we are rather middle of the road.
Thinking like an underdog is not just when there is a problem.	No; Canada operates in an atmosphere of great prosperity and security.

Table 4: Typical Mistakes and Canadian Policy

Not keeping things simple and honest.	No: The refugee program could hardly be simpler.
Going against, instead of with, the flow of events.	No. Canada is not doing enough to be going against the grain or ruffling any feathers.
Ignoring the need to wait, rushing headlong into action.	No, I believe Canada is thoughtful, although the jury is out about Afghanistan
Ignoring the unintended consequences of your actions.	No evidence either way
Working on the wrong problem.	Yes. Canada has not correctly identified the causes of the conflict, and therefore is ineffective
Not specifying their objectives enough	Yes
Not developing enough alternatives.	Don’t know; hard to say what is in policy-makers minds
Giving inadequate thought to tradeoffs.	No; inadequate thought to what could be gained, or a contribution worthy of being made
Disregarding uncertainty.	No; disregards that doing nothing is also a decision
Failing to account for your risk tolerance.	No; risk tolerance is very low, probably a major factor in decision-making.
Failing to plan ahead when decisions are linked over time	No
Not trusting your intuition.	No

Before 2000, Canada held the chairmanship of the Refugee Working Group in 1992, and participated in it until its suspension in 1996. This working group organized four formal missions to refugee camps between 1994 and 1999. It also participated in similar missions to refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria. The goal here was to highlight the complexity of the problems and their urgency. It recently renewed an international dialogue on the issue through the Refugee Coordination Forum. Canada also funded a program to relocate Palestinian refugees from Canada Camp in the Sinai to Gaza between 1994 and 2000. All Palestinians in Canada Camp are now back in the Gaza strip.

More than 200 women from Palestinian refugee communities in Lebanon have received scholarships from this fund to pursue local undergraduate university degrees and develop professional and management skills in such sectors as business, engineering, biology and science. The fund is managed by the International Development and Research Centre on behalf of the Canadian International Development Agency. The Canada Fund is a development program administered by Canadian missions in the region which aims to assist non-governmental organizations to carry out small innovative development projects.

Compared to the declaratory policy, this certainly represents more activity and more practically meaningful contributions. What is interesting from an analytical standpoint is that while there are many themes in declaratory policy, there is only one area where there is activity, that of the refugees. It also happens to be an area where Canada has considerable expertise, and has acted with distinction.

My argument here is that, if Canada does not want to become a major player and implement a strategy in the Middle East, and there are no signs that it does, then it should at least conduct a strategic intervention. We need strategic intervention when, instead of designing a strategy, we look at the other parties’ actions and instead of creating a strategy, we reverse engineer the best tactics that can be designed. We do so by identifying the do-or-die moments, by determining who are the significant political actors in the country, individuals or groups, by distinguishing between significant and insignificant actors, by examining what influence various actors have on a particular action, by determining which resources support the political system, which are scarce, and which are essential, by looking at how political actors manage them, what factors favor which political actors. We also ask these latter questions about tactics, actors, resources, rules. Only then do we design a response, and that response is much more likely to have an impact. That analysis reveals that in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the key to the rest of the peace negotiations really are the refugees. I.e. the Palestinians who became concentrated in Gaza and the West Bank.

A Government Dealing With an Insurgency: Afghanistan 2001-2006

I begin by considering prima facie evidence regarding a government or group being in a disadvantaged or underdog situation, and whether this amounts to enough to justify assigning them underdog status. I then examine the characteristics and mistakes typical of underdogs.

Prima Facie Evidence of Underdog Status

The case that Afghanistan is an underdog in the international system rests on evidence of how its political instability and inability to implement social and political reforms compare to other nations. Once the government takes on the characteristics of an underdog, however, these characteristics will show up in both domestic and international actions. Unfortunately, Afghanistan has suffered from such chronic instability and conflict during so much of its modern history, that its economy and infrastructure are in ruins, and many of its people are refugees.

Afghanistan state institutions have been weak for decades, giving rise to instability and unsuccessful attempts to modernize the society. These efforts go back to 1926 and the defeat of King Amanullah’s social reforms by conservative forces. In 1953, Prime Minister (and General) Mohammed Daud introduced social reforms again, including the abolition of the seclusion of women. After he left power, the introduction of a constitutional monarchy led to political polarization and power struggles. But in 1973, Daud seized power again. In playing the USSR against Western powers, he alienated left-wing factions which overthrew and killed him in 1978. The victors, the People's Democratic Party, had Khalq and Parcham factions. The Khalq faction eventually purged and exiled most Parcham leaders, as conservative Islamic and ethnic leaders in the country revolted against social changes. In 1979, the Soviets backed the Parcham faction leader, Babrak Karmal, who was duly installed, while the US, Pakistan, China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia supplied money and arms to anti-Soviet mujahedeen groups. Civil war raged from 1988 to 1993 as rival militias vied for influence after the Soviet withdrew. These militias eventually agreed to form a government with Burhanuddin Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik, as president, though factional contests continued. In 1995, the Pashtun-dominated Taliban emerged and seized control of Kabul in 1996. By 1997 they, and their extremist version of Islam, controlled about two-thirds of country.

There matters rested until terrorists attacked the United States on September 11, 2001. In October, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan after the Taliban government refused to hand over Osama bin Laden, the architect of those attacks. Once the U.S. had defeated the Taliban government, mmeetings of various Afghan leaders, sponsored by the United Nations, produced an interim government and an agreement to allow a peacekeeping force to enter Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai, who headed the provisional administration, won a five-year term in Afghanistan's first direct presidential elections in October 2004, with 55.4% of the vote. Karzai, a Pashtun, was an effective player on the world stage who also enjoyed strong American backing, persuading international donors to pledge $US 4 billion in 2002.

Given this history, then, it is no wonder the UN Security Council found Afghanistan at risk of becoming a failed democracy in November 2006 because of its fragile state institutions, the increase in Taliban violence, and the growing illegal drug production. In addition to these reasons, the Karzai government has yet to achieve national unity. National unity has been elusive both because the nation is diverse and because has a poor history of human rights. In the 1980’s, the Soviet invasion brought mass killings, torture, and a landscape littered with land mines. The subsequent civil war brought extensive abuses by the armed factions vying for power. When the Taliban were in power, they were particularly notorious for their human rights abuses against women. Without a tradition of respect and participation by various groups, it is not possible to hope for a strong central government being established other than by force.

If the government of Afghanistan can be considered an underdog because of politics, the Taliban after 2001 can be considered underdogs for military ones. The case here rests on the military defeat of the Taliban government by the U.S. in late 2001 having an impact on future governments.

Table 5: Evidence of Characteristics of Underdog Strategy

Characteristic	Karzai government
They are always thinking about what the strong are about to do	Smaller political parties watched Hamid Karzai’s party to take advantage of any misstep.
They play a waiting game.	Slow, gradual development of legal system, modest Afghanistan Compact benchmarks on development
They are holistic.	Willingness to work with governments of other countries over development and reconstruction
They are always scanning their environment.	Starvation, refugee problems failed to materialize
They specifically design each action to suit their strategy.	Clearly conscious of the necessity for development and economic progress to support their efforts at democracy
They are always forecasting for all events.	Decision-making processes slow and ineffectual
They are convinced they will lose a direct confrontation.	Accepts both foreign troops, even when unpopular
They will break their own rules.	Bargains with warlords who operate outside the law, maintaining private armies and jails and threatening people who speak out against them in the Loya Jirga
Their commitment is complete.	ministers continuing to hold office despite the dangers of assassination

Table 6: Evidence of Strategic Mistakes

Type of Mistake	Karzai Government
Working on the Wrong Problem.	Foreign forces conquer the country, but not well suited to counter-insurgency
Not Specifying Their Objectives Enough.	Unclear terms of reference, procedures for: ministries, provincial offices, liaison between legislative and executive; too little accountability to prevent patronage, misuse of public funds, abuse of public land management, and corruption in the privatization of state-owned enterprises; policies sidelined increasing popular dissatisfaction, and favored marginalization and intolerance of political opposition
Giving Inadequate Thought To Tradeoffs	Inadequate vetting of army/police candidates led to harassment and threats to ppolitical organizers and journalists
Disregarding Uncertainty	Corruption of government officials
Failing To Account For Your Risk Tolerance.	History of ethnic and tribal lack of unity; domination of one ethnic group to the exclusion of others
Failing to Plan Ahead When Decisions Are Linked Over Time.	Allowing the opium trade to develop to the point of being a parallel power structure

Identifying the Strategic Corporal in a Crowd

With a single half day’s worth of training, it is possible for armed forces to identify those who are already thinking in the same terms as the insurgents, the so-called strategic corporals, and to introduce the others to the basics of that way of thinking.[10] The main obstacle to the proposed training is habitus, their usual ways of thinking, which tends to become more rigid over time.[11]

Habitus is the system of durable, transferable dispositions produced by the conditioning associated with a particular class of conditions of existence. The conditions of existence produce generating, organizing principles of practice and of mental representation of situations, which can be objectively adapted in their aim, but without the awareness of those aims and the mastery explicit of the operations necessary to attain them. The more specialized the training, the more affluent and/or successful the people, the more resistance there can be to learning, the more rigid the way of thinking. However, the habitus usually will become less rigid in times of crisis: the more severe the crisis, the more open people will become, and while it may be too late to help solve the crisis at hand, it is possible to introduce training at that time.

In a range of people trained so far, there have always been a proportion of individuals who used strategy including mètis. There is no reason to think that NATO personnel would be an exception, although the proportion of those natural strategists is unknown. Moreover, the proportion of natural strategists among visible minorities, women, the disabled, and others with some sort of permanent disadvantage is much greater. If this also holds true for armed forces, then those who have made efforts at diversity may be receiving an unexpected dividend.

The proposed training proposed below takes about two hours. The two exercises are: discovery and diagnosis, and development of the core idea.

Exercise 1: Discovery and Diagnosis

This exercise takes one to one and a half hours. Its objective is to introduce the participants to the basics of strategy including mètis. The trainer asks participants to play a simple board game, such as checkers or chess. The materials required are simple: board games for every two or four participants, since the exercise works for people working in teams of two in playing the board game; pads of paper and pens; and either a chalkboard, a flipchart, an overhead projector or a document camera. The board game should be culturally appropriate and its rules common knowledge. The exercise allows for the use of translators if necessary. Once the matches are under way, gives participants a structured set of tasks of increasing complexity to force the failure of rational thought alone. The trainer then asks participants to come up with a core idea, and use it. The trainer observes participants and coaches them as necessary. What the trainer is looking for is the ability to predict outcomes in increasing numbers of scenarios, and the ability to think ahead to a much greater extent. People who can do this are likely to be natural strategists, and are much more likely to be practicing the strategy of the weak. The trainer confirms with participants when they are using mètis. At the close of this exercise, the trainer facilitates a discussion about the effectiveness of the first experience with a core idea. In the alternative, the trainer can assign the worksheet shown below, an integration learning tool commonly used in management or business

Exercise 2: The Core Idea

Because coming up with a core idea is often the most difficult part of thinking like an underdog, this exercise can be completed quickly that will stimulate the thinking of the participants.

Here, the participant must start thinking in metaphorical terms about the tasks at hand. This worksheet is deliberately simple, to facilitate the focus needed for mètis. In completing this worksheet, the participant will see that not all metaphors are equally practical or helpful -- it is therefore useful to develop a number of them so that the participant can choose the best one. The present worksheet should be completed for the same sample task described above.

There are a number of caveats to the training proposed above. First, the workshop and training are, at the time of this writing, untried and untested in this proposed application. Second, the proportions of types of practitioners of underdog strategists in the military is not known and the first type of learner may be found in much lower proportions than in other walks of life. Third, the training of troops proposed can be ordered, but the learning cannot. They may participate in the workshop while resisting the learning. Fourth, the people being trained are going to be primarily young men not given to introspection, to say nothing of abstract thought, and the habitus may proved an even greater obstacle than foreseen here. Fifth, the optimum effectiveness for this training is no doubt to have it integrated into the regular training, about which the author needs to know more.

Sample Worksheet: Core Idea
Category	Suggested Metaphors, Images, Analogies, Role Models	Your Metaphors, Images, Role Models, Analogies	Core Idea
Military	Machine gun, rifle, tank	Battalion, submarine, armored personnel carrier	Work together like a c-3 gun and a shell
Geographical	River, waterfall, creek	Mountain, plateau, desert	A 24-hour oasis
Plant	Tree, fern, Venus flytrap	Flower, tomato, potato	Let’s close up camp like one of those evening prayer plants
Transportation	Bus, golf cart, car	Truck, walking, running, bicycle	Let’s make our break like a cruise ship for the night
Sports	Caddy, gymnastics, football	Soccer, tennis, ping pong
Mechanical	Wrench, Allen key, ratchet	Silicone gun, screwdriver
Insects	Mosquito, ant, butterfly	Bee, wasp, slug	Let’s circle around the queen bee
Animals	Cougar, puma rhinoceros	Tiger, lion, gazelle, turtle
Role models	Princess Diana, Donald Trump, Gandhi	Mother Theresa, Montgomery of Alamein
Your own Category:	Your own metaphors:

Conclusion

There are three benefits to this approach.

(1) Unit of analysis

The analyst can forecast developments and actions much more accurately by using action as the unit of analysis rather than the actor. If the analyst uses patterns of actions, like strategy, it is even better. It is a little like playing chess. A player begins by observing the opponent’s moves. If these seem to be uncoordinated or going in a variety of different directions‚ so much the better. It means that the opponent is not thinking strategically‚ and will be that much easier to defeat. On the other hand‚ it may not be in the player’s best interest to make assumptions about an opponent’s confused state of mind or ineffective planning. Instead, the player has information about that opponent and can use it to predict the kind of strategy the opponent is most likely to use, based on that information. At that point‚ it is much easier to determine which strategy the opponent is actually using. Once the strategy is known‚ then the rate of success in predicting the tactical decisions will increase exponentially‚ whatever the circumstances. The main drawback is that strategic analysis based on the new definition of strategy provides insight only into the specific scope or level of the analysis, neither above nor below it. It means, in practical terms, that the analysis of national health policy will not provide guidance in the reform of radiology services in a hospital or private clinic, for example. It also means that the analysis will provide probabilities rather than certainties in its predictions.

(2) Mid-Level Theory

When David Easton outlined the three major levels of theory in political science, he discussed grand theory and low-level theory in the most detail.[12] Most difficult of all to grasp and to discuss was mid-level theory. Theories in International Relations or in public administration, for example, oscillated between grand and low-level theory. The potential contribution of a general theory of strategy and mètis, built around an old concept broadened out to apply to more than business or war is significant. At that time, strategy, to the extent it was studied at all, was considered to be within strategic studies, which was within international relations, which was within political science. If studied theoretically, then it had the potential to change the context easily – but there were few general theories of strategy at the mid-level, as Easton predicted, and none which were useable for non-military application.

Strategy presents two advantages as the starting point for mid-level theory. First, it is integrative: it takes as its units of analysis action or patterns of action, rather than actors as does most other theory of political science. Second, it generates both high theory and practical applications, because strategy as a concept lies as the meeting place between thought and action. Students of strategy can therefore easily more towards the more abstract or the more practical, depending on his/her goals in research. This is what the theory and method has allowed.

(3) Polyvalence

As a phenomenon, strategy presents considerable theoretical and practical interest. From a theoretical standpoint, it presents the advantage of being applicable to a wide range of situations. Because it analyses action rather than the actor, it can be applied to any actor. Developing a general theory for strategy also frees its validity from any regional or thematic context. Strategy can therefore be applied to any context. From a practical standpoint, a strategy generates a number of polyvalent tools and training programs, intelligible to the strategist, but more importantly to the non-strategist lay person as well. These methodologies present the advantage of allowing learning from a book and a set of theoretical exercises, or by experiential pedagogy. They can be broken down into components requiring as little as one hour’s training for proficiency, as experience shows. These methodologies have been proposed as valid irrespective of the goals, aspirations, values, socio-economic circumstances, or worldviews of the individuals, groups, or institutions involved.

The polyvalence should be assed on the basis of three strands of research. The first strand focuses on methodological and theoretical development of this new theory of strategy. The second strand presents several structured sets of case studies focusing on the various types of actors in political science, broadly defined. The third strand presents a series of exercises and worksheets which pertain either to particular applications of strategy or which spans the intellectual development of a good strategist. There are several studies needed, summarized in Table 7. The studies already completed can be found in Table 8, Summary of Completed Studies, by Unit of Analysis.

Table 7: Summary of Necessary Research, by Unit of Analysis

Level	Theory	Cases	Applications
Phenomenon	Strategic Research	Strategic Research	Strategic Research
Supranational group	Strategy and the Catholic Church	Strategy and the Catholic church	Strategy and Counterinsurgency
Systems		Strategy and health cases	Strategy and health

Table 7: Completed Studies, By Unit of Analysis

Level	Theory	Cases	Applications
Phenomenon	Bioterrorism and Medical and Health Services Administration	Bioterrorism and Medical and Health Services Administration	Bioterrorism and Medical and Health Services Administration
Individual	Strategy for individuals	Strategy for individuals	Strategic activism, More Strategic Activism
Infranational group	Campaign Strategy	Campaign Strategy	Political strategy and politics
Supranational group
Systems	Prescription for Change
States	Strategy and Ethnic Conflict	Various articles	Analyzing National and International Policy
Group of states	Strategy for the Pacific Century	NATO and Eastern Europe After 2000	Path to peace

My own desire is to have strategy used to improve the common good. Nonetheless, I cannot help but acknowledge, however, that strategy is an ethically neutral concept. Its application and results depend entirely on the user.

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[1] Marcel Detienne et Jean-Pierre Venant, Les ruses de l’intelligence (Paris: Flammarion, 1972).

[2] Although daring, attempting such a correction is not without recent precedent.Philippe Nemo, What Is the West? (New York: Duquesne University Press, 2007).

[3] Gary Klein, Sources of Power (Boston: MIT Press, 1998), 213ss.

[4] Gautam Naik “Hospital Races to Learn Lessons of Ferrari Pit Stop,” Wall Street Journal November 14 2006 p.1

[5] Kate Murphy, “What Pilots Can Teach Hospitals About Patient Safety,” New York Times, October 31, 2006, 1.

[6] “The Waggle Dance” New Scientist, 25 November 2006, 56.

[7] John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Viking, 1987).

[8] Gary Klein, Sources of Power (Boston: MIT Press 1998).

[9] John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Viking, 1987).

[10] Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines Magazine (January 1999).

[11] Pierre Bourdieu, Le sens pratique (Paris : Minuit, 1980), p. 88.

[12] David Easton, Analysis of Political Structure (New York: Routledge, 1990).